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LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD: SARBANESOXLEY AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Scott Harshbarger* and Goutam U. Jois**

I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important questions facing American society today
centers around the role of corporations. Undoubtedly, corporations wield
a tremendous amount of power in contemporary affairs. For example,
when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, Wal-Mart, the world’s
largest retailer, pledged $1 million on August 30, 2005,1 a full three days
before government aid arrived.2 While there are surely a variety of
reactions to that course of events, this particular response highlights our
country’s reliance on corporate entities for a variety of societal functions
beyond the “typical” roles of production and employment.3 One of the
*
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experience. Finally, we would like to thank Prof. Judith Stephenson, Northeastern Law '87; as well
as Umesh, Indira, Malasa, and Mallika Jois, and Elizabeth Brown, without whose support this
project would not be possible.
1. See, e.g., Parija Bhatnagar, Wal-Mart Closes 123 Stores from Storm, CNNMONEY, Aug.
31, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/30/news/fortune500/katrina_retailers/.
2. See, e.g., Scott Shane, After Failures, Officials Play Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2005, at A1.
3. See, e.g., E-mail from Don Davenport, Procomm Consulting Group, to authors, (Sept. 2,
2005, 10:24:07 EDT) (on file with authors) (“We are witnessing the result of years of government
neglect . . . What does this say about a nation that turns to WalMart for relief supplies? The
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biggest questions that comes to the fore when discussing corporations’
role is that of corporate governance: how companies are run internally
and what rules they will play by in the external world.4
In a narrow sense, good corporate governance means shareholders
realize value and boards of directors have an easier time fulfilling their
fiduciary duties. More broadly, corporate governance is about the
principles that underlie democracy: transparency, checks and balances,
and accountability.5 Good corporate governance means that businesses
recognize the duties that correspond to the privileges that society has
granted them: favorable tax treatment, limited liability, and so forth.
When scandals strike the public or nonprofit sectors, there is often a loud
call for accountability, ethics, and integrity, and rightly so. This is
rationalized on the grounds that these entities receive public funding,
subsidies, tax-exemptions and other related benefits. However, as the
Katrina story indicates and as scholars have discussed,6 corporations
spokesm[e]n for WalMart and Lo[ew]s w[ere] on TV sending relief supplies before the President of
the United States.”).
4. Corporate governance is “[i]n essence . . . the structure that is intended to make sure that
the right questions get asked and that checks and balances are in place to make sure that the answers
reflect what is best for the creation of long-term, sustainable value.” ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL
MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (3d ed. 2004). The primary participants are (1) the
shareholders, (2) the management (led by the executive officer), and (3) the board of directors. Id. at
6.
5. Another article makes the analogy to democracy more forcefully. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii,
and Andrew Metrick write:
Corporations are republics. The ultimate authority rests with voters (shareholders). These
voters elect representatives (directors) who delegate most decisions to bureaucrats
(managers). As in any republic, the actual power-sharing relationship depends upon the
specific rules of governance. One extreme, which tilts toward a democracy, reserves
little power for management and allows shareholders to quickly and easily replace
directors. The other extreme, which tilts toward a dictatorship, reserves extensive power
for management and places strong restrictions on shareholders’ ability to replace
directors.
Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 107 (2003).
The connection between corporate governance and democracy in the abstract sometimes
has real political implications in practice. Gretchen Morgenson reports that the issue of executive
pay at two major utility companies is affecting the campaigns for political office in Illinois.
Gretchen Morgenson, Executive Pay Becomes Political, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2006, § 3, at 1.
Gubernatorial candidates are promising to try to renew the freeze on electricity rates to assist
consumers and prevent companies from using new stock plans to “capture a windfall from the rate
increase” for executives. Id. Mark Hulbert writes that a new study strongly suggests that companies
that make political contributions to the most Congressional candidates enjoy better performance in
stocks and experience “faster subsequent growth in their profitability” than companies that
contribute to fewer candidates. Mark Hulbert, The Share-Price-to-Campaign-Contribution Ratio,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2006, § 3, at 6.
6. See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of
Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 120 n.465 (2004) (discussing the
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play a significant role in society as well. Arguably, corporations exert
more influence and play a greater role in our daily lives than other
governmental or social institutions. Accordingly, we should be even
more concerned about good corporate governance.
Corporate governance recently tends to bring to mind the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).7 SOX was passed in response to the
corporate scandals of the early 2000s (particularly Enron and
WorldCom).8 The Act has garnered much attention, as it represents the
most sweeping and comprehensive overhaul of federal corporate
governance law since the securities laws of 1933 and 1934.9 In the
intervening four years commentators from all walks of political, legal
and academic life have considered its utility.10 Corporate governance
remains a timely issue. Recent class action and bankruptcy legislation,
continued earnings restatements and accounting scandals, new
regulations and investigations of hedge funds and mutual funds, whitecollar criminal prosecutions, and recently-finalized settlements, fines,
influence that corporations have in society and in particular on regulations); cf. GEORGE J. STIGLER,
MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 115-118 (1988) (noting the “actual effects of
economic regulations” and arguing that the regulations actually served the interests of firms and
industries, not the public interest).
7. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amendment in scattered sections of 15, 18
U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOX].
8. SOX was first introduced on February 14, 2002 and was signed into law on July 30th,
2002. Id. The SEC began investigating Enron in October, 2001 and WorldCom in March of 2002.
See Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES, Aug. 26, 2002,
http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html [hereinafter Timeline]; Timeline of
Enron Collapse, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A25624-2002Jan10; The Rise and Fall of WorldCom,
USA
TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/telecom/2002-07-21-worldcomchronology_x.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2006).
9. See, e.g., Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Bush Signs Corporate
Corruption Bill (July 30, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/07/20020730.html (describing SOX as “the most far-reaching reforms of American business
practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt).
10. See, e.g., Sarita Mohanty, Sarbanes-Oxley: Can One Model Fit All?, 12 NEW ENG. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 231 (2006); Joseph F. Morrissey, Catching the Culprits: Is Sarbanes-Oxley
Enough?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801 (2003); Susan J. Stabile, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Rules of
Professional Responsibility Viewed Through a Sextonian Lens, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 31
(2004); Timothy L. Weston, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Under Siege: Solutions for Solving the
Problems of Implementing Section 404, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 86 (2006); Erica Gann,
Comment, Judicial Action In Retrograde: The Case For Applying Section 804 Of The SarbanesOxley Act To All Fraud Actions Under The Securities Laws, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1043 (2004);
Jennifer S. Recine, Note, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535 (2002); Michael D. Silberfarb, Note, Justifying
Punishment For White-Collar Crime: A Utilitarian And Retributive Analysis Of The SarbanesOxley Act, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 95 (2003).
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and penalties all indicate that the corporate governance landscape is still
unsettled.11 What balance will be struck in the relationship between
corporations and other basic societal institutions? The answer remains
uncertain.
Importantly, perhaps most important to shareholders, we now know
that Enron and WorldCom were not just the work of a few “bad apples.”
We have seen story after story of corporate malfeasance over the past
four years.12 As a result even honest, ethical CEOs are finding it harder
to compete in the marketplace.13 Instead of embracing responsibilities to
all of their stakeholders,14 too many corporate leaders try to shirk their
obligations and get away with doing as little as possible.15
11. 2005 saw the passage of new class action and bankruptcy legislation. Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.A); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1098, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.A.). There was also a
multitude of earnings restatements. A sampling includes the Bermuda-based insurance company
Ace; Taser International, which makes stun guns; Kanebo, a Japanese cosmetics company;
CharterMac, a real estate finance company; ConAgra, one of the country’s largest food companies;
and Eastman Kodak, the photography company. See Joseph B. Treaster, Ace to Restate 5 Years of
Earnings to Correct Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at C4; Stun Gun Maker to Restate 2004
Earnings, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2005, at C12; Todd Zaun, Cosmetics Maker Restates Earnings,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2005, at C5; Tax Errors Force ConAgra to Restate Earnings, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2005, at C13; Kodak to Restate Some Earnings for Accounting Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 2005, at C3. Hedge funds were subject to regulation under the Investment Advisers Act as of
February 1, 2006, see 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2 (2005), until that regulation was struck down, see
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The SEC promulgated rules requiring mutual
funds boards to have an independent chairman and also have at least three-fourths of their directors
be independent. See SEC Release No. IC-26520, “Investment Company Governance” (July 27,
2004); see also 17 C.F.R. Part 270.0-1(a)(7)(i), (iv) (describing the three-fourths rule and the
independent chairman requirement, respectively). However, that rule, too, was recently struck down
for failing to comply with requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Chamber of
Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006). For a discussion of relatively
recent indictments over tax and accounting fraud, see infra notes 93-96. By the end of the 2006, the
“McNulty Memo” had restrained government prosecutors, the SEC had promulgated a more lenient
rule regarding Section 404 compliance for small firms, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations were revised in light of corporations’ concerns. See infra notes 64-72 and
accompanying text. In short, the landscape keeps changing at rapid pace — this Article will surely
be outdated by the time it is printed — and the issue remains timely.
12. See generally Timeline, supra note 8.
13. See, e.g., Ken Belson, WorldCom’s Audacious Failure and Its Toll on an Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at C1 (discussing the impact of WorldCom’s malfeasance on its competitors).
14. See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, supra note 6, at 34-35 (discussing the question of
“stakeholder” obligations and whether corporations have obligations to non-shareholder
constituencies); see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV 733 (2005). Corporate managers should have the discretion, but not a duty, to
sacrifice some amount of profits in the name of the public interest. See id. at 743.
15. Conversely, when it comes to lining their own pockets, they are trying to get away with
doing as much as possible. See infra Part IVB (discussing clawbacks). President Bush recently
criticized business executives for excessive compensation. See Jim Rutenberg, Bush Tells Wall St.
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Those charged with enforcing laws against corporations, primarily
Attorneys General, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
and the Department of Justice, have their hands full aggressively
investigating corporations, a situation that has led to antagonism. For
example, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer has extracted
settlements from corporations on a regular basis, to significant
criticism.16 William Donaldson, former Chairman of the SEC, was
regarded as anti-business because he pushed through aggressive
regulations of corporations, mutual funds and others, even though he
was appointed by President George W. Bush, a Republican.17
Christopher Cox has vowed to follow in Donaldson’s footsteps,
continuing the application of clear and consistently enforced rules.18
We argue that this antagonism is unnecessarily combative and
counterproductive. Recent developments in corporate law illustrate a
few major themes. First, regulators have woken up to the prevalence of
corporate fraud and malfeasance. SOX was passed as a reaction to a few
salient examples of corporate crime, but its proactive applicability and
its potential lie in preventing such crime in the future.19 Second, this
to Rethink Pay Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at C11. President Bush made the point that
executives’ pay should be based on increasing shareholder value and that investor trust is critical to
the success of American markets. See id. The President’s call sounds a common theme, but we
should not lose sight of the fact that reform is not an end in itself. Trust in markets matters, but only
to the extent that ethical conduct fosters trust. If investors regain trust in markets, only to get
hoodwinked again, we will know that businesses lead to build more than just “trust.”
16. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Maybe Spitzer’s Cape Was Too Big, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, §
3, at 4 (discussing Spitzer’s strategy of bringing charges and then negotiating a settlement, and
praising a Bank of America broker for fighting the charges and getting acquitted). For a general
discussion of Spitzer’s various enforcement and prosecution efforts, see Michael Luo, Spitzer
Makes Push for New Laws to Help Punish Medicaid Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at B3; Jeff
Leeds, Sony BMG Called Close to Settlement with Spitzer, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2005, at C1; Eric
Dash, Spitzer Says Banks Are Resisting Inquiry on Lending Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at
C2.
17. See, e.g., Joseph Nocera, Starting Off by Doing Right on Options, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
2005, at C1 (describing former Chairman Donaldson as a “zealous regulator” and Donaldson’s
successor as “the anti-Donaldson, a pro-business California Republican”).
18. Chris Cox, Congressman, Nomination Speech (June 2, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050602-4.html.
19. Indeed, one unintended positive consequence of SOX was the revelation of stock option
scandals. SOX requires more timely disclosure so grants are harder to hide. Previously, executives
could disclose stock option grants as late as thirteen months after the grant itself; SOX has lowered
that time frame to forty-eight hours. An extensive statistical study of option grants from 1992 to
2002 revealed that executives either “possessed truly extraordinary abilities to forecast precise
overall market movements” or were “backdating the grants.” Geoffrey Colvin, A Study in CEO
Greed, FORTUNE, June 12, 2006, at 53. After SOX’s new reporting requirement, “backdating
virtually disappears.” Id. Colvin’s article was citing the groundbreaking study by Erik Lie at the
University of Iowa. See Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MANAGEMENT
SCI. 802 (2005) available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/Grants-MS.pdf. See also David
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regulation is here to stay. There is enough support from groups like
institutional investors and regulators to ensure that SOX will continue
for some time. Indeed, the debates today center on how much of SOX
should be relaxed, not (generally) whether the law should be scrapped
altogether.20 Moreover, the steady stream of corporate fraud revelations
(recently, for example, with accounting issues at Fannie Mae21 and
options backdating at Apple22) indicates that rolling back regulation
would be the wrong move at the wrong time.
Simultaneously, however, it is smart politics to recognize that
corporate interests have been particularly well-received in today’s
political climate. One group led by Hal Scott of Harvard Law School
and another led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have been influential
in calling for a relaxation of SOX requirements, particularly in the
context of small firms.23 Thus, any proposals to modify existing
corporate governance or securities laws should aim to work with
business leaders and not merely try to regulate them into submission, if
such a thing were even possible.
In this Article, we argue that all groups: business leaders, regulators
and shareholders, should recognize the steps that must be taken to create
a competitive, fair and ethical corporate climate.24 We are not calling
merely for “voluntary cooperation” from businesses to improve the

Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. FIN.
449 (1997); David Henry, A Sarbox Surprise: The New Requirements are Slowing Options Tricks,
BUS. WK., June 12, 2006, at 38. This is one of the rarely-discussed benefits of SOX. Another
important benefit has been the revelation of accounting irregularities, malicious and otherwise, at
smaller firms. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (discussing how SOX, and Section
404 in particular, have subjected smaller firms to scrutiny for the first time, and how in many that
scrutiny is revealing misconduct).
20. See, e.g., Mark A. Stein, Airlines, Now Healthy, Getting Frisky, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2006, at C2. But see William A. Niskanen, Enron’s Last Victim: American Markets, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2007, at A21 (arguing that “[a]s Senator Sarbanes and Representative Oxley drift into
retirement, their act should retire with them”).
21. Eric Dash, Regulators Denounce Fannie Mae, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2006, at C1.
22. John Markoff & Eric Dash, Apple Panel on Options Backs Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2006, at C1 (describing the investigation into options manipulation at Apple and concluding that exexecutives were at fault, not current CEO Steven P. Jobs).
23. See infra notes 138-47 (highlighting the activities of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce-led
group).
24. The word “ethical” is important here. As we have pointed out in a related piece, an ethical
dilemma is not deciding whether to break the law. An ethical dilemma arises when one could make
the wrong decision within the bounds of the law. See Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois,
Deterring White Collar Crime, BOSTON BUS. J., Aug. 19-25, 2005, at 47; see also Damon Darlin,
Adviser Urges H.P. to Focus On Ethics Over Legalities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2006, at C3 (describing
the preliminary conclusion of the outside lawyer asked to review H.P.’s investigations policy, that
“it was ethics, not the law, that needed to be paid more heed”).
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current situation. Indeed, SOX exists and is appropriate for this situation
precisely because it imposes baseline obligations with which
corporations are required to comply. Moreover, other regulations
regarding independent directors, expensing of stock options, etc. are
needed and are vital to keeping business interests in line with society’s.
However, business leaders and regulators will have an easier time
promoting a healthy marketplace if industry gets “ahead of the curve.” In
the end, business leaders must do just that by leading and implementing
broad mechanisms of self-regulation and monitoring. Most important,
the changes that need to be made are neither radical nor difficult.
Executives and regulators must adopt common-sense reforms. Through
proactive regulation, public officials should create and align
corporations’ incentives so that they can then find market solutions to
governance issues. Business leaders, regulators and citizens can work
together to create a climate of corporate integrity.
Business leaders should:
• Conduct independent audits of governance structures,
focusing on ethical conduct,
• Enact aggressive “clawback” provisions to keep CEOs
accountable,
• Empower boards of directors to properly serve shareholders’
interests,
• Recognize that “doing well” involves “doing good,” and
• Use independent professionals as ballast to corporate leaders.
Regulators should:
• Recognize and reduce the high compliance costs on smalland mid-sized firms,
• Allow differently-situated firms to adopt different
compliance procedures,
• Provide amnesty to companies that disclose wrongdoing up
front, and
• Prosecute as a means toward an end, not as an end in itself.
Citizens and investors should:
• Demand good governance from the companies they invest in,
even when markets are doing well.
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II. THE SITUATION TODAY
A. Contemporary Background
The most important thing to note about recent corporate scandals is
that they have continued unabated since the crisis in the early 2000s.
Enron was just the tip of the iceberg: there was much more fraud, and it
infected companies of all sizes in all industries. A sample of corporate
scandals for everything from insider trading to outright theft includes
ImClone (2001), Tyco (2002), WorldCom (2002), Adelphia (2002),
HealthSouth (2002), Qwest (2002), NYSE (2003), Parmalat (2003),
Marsh and McLennan (2004), AIG (2005), Krispy Kreme (2005), and
Fannie Mae (2006), to name a few.25 Wall Street did not escape
unscathed, with Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, and many other
Wall Street brokerages all under investigation at some point for
everything from illegal trading to conflicts of interest.26 The mutual fund
scandals particularly brought small investor and middle class attention to
the dangers and costs of poor governance.27 Politicians and
governmental entities can no longer afford the appearance of being soft
on corporate excess, and corporations are likely to feel the sting of an
angry public as well.
Shareholder activism has even pressured those indirectly involved
in malfeasance. For example, J.P. Morgan reached a $1 billion
settlement with Enron after the energy giant sued the bank, saying that
J.P. Morgan contributed to the company’s spectacular bankruptcy.28 The
SEC separately charged the banks with being complicit in the fraud,
adding hundreds of millions more dollars to the disgorgements, fines,
25 See, e.g., Timeline, supra note 8 (referencing scandals at Authur Anderson, Enron, Quest
Communications International, Tyco, WorldCom, Adelphia, and Xerox); Francesca di Meglio,
Inside the Parmalat Scandal: What You Need to Know?, ITALIANSRUS.COM, Dec. 28, 2003,
http://www.italiansrus.com/articles/ourpaesani/parmalat.htm (discussing the Parmalat scandal);
Greenberg
Out,
AIG
Stock
Sinks,
CNNMONEY,
Mar.
15,
2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/03/15/news/fortune500/aig/index.htm (discussing the AIG scandal);
Rick Brooks, Krispy Kreme Ousts Six Executives, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2005, at B3 (discussing the
Krispy Kreme scandal); Dash, supra note 21 (discussing the Fannie Mae scandal).
26. Gretchen Morgenson & Patrick McGeehan, Corporate Conduct: The Overview: Wall
Street Firms ready to pay $1 billion in fines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at A1.
27. Claudia H. Deutsch, Revolt of the Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, § 3, at 1
(describing how shareholders have demanded governance reforms at some of the largest companies,
including Wal-Mart, GE, and Citigroup).
28. See, e.g., Julie Creswell, J.P. Morgan and Toronto-Dominion Agree to Settle Suits in
Enron Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, at C3; Press Release, JP Morgan Chase, JP Morgan
Chase
Announces
Settlement
with
Enron
(Aug.
16,
2005),
available
at
http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/press/releaseDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=171010.
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and penalties paid.29
Of course, this does not imply that all corporate executives, board
members, and officers are ill-intentioned or even of dubious moral
character. Many well-meaning business leaders are simply confused by a
regulatory environment that is in flux, imposes costs, and poorly
articulates what benefits, if any, accrue to the corporation.30 Other
business leaders might want to act but are unsure how, since they are
under the constant scrutiny of regulators, auditors, and lawyers. The
slightest misstep, even if done in good faith, can cost billions of dollars.
Indeed, it is possible that not one of the executives of Enron, WorldCom,
or any other now-vilified company set out to do evil. Instead, they were
tempted to “fudge,” time and again, until a mere white lie became
outright fraud.31 The “choices” that these individuals made were not
choices as we commonly think of them, but decisions that were
significantly constrained by the strong situational pressures that the
market and its profit motive exerted.32
Take the example of Bernard Ebbers, the former CEO of
WorldCom. In August 2005, he was sentenced to twenty-five years in
prison for his role in the company’s demise.33 Yet while he was
presiding over an eleven-billion dollar fraud,34 Ebbers was very wellrespected in the community for his generosity; he was a Sunday school
29. See SEC Charges J.P. Morgan Chase in Connection with Enron’s Accounting Fraud,
Litigation Release No. 18252, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1820, 80 SEC
Docket 2286 (July 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18252.htm; see
also SEC Charges Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Three Executives with Aiding and
Abetting Enron’s Accounting Fraud, Litigation Release No. 18517, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 1932, 81 SEC Docket 3038 (Dec. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18517.htm.
30. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, A New Mood in Congress to Forgo Corporate Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at C3 [hereinafter Labaton, New Mood] (discussing the push by businesses to
rollback all or part of Sarbanes-Oxley).
31. See, e.g., E-mail from Frank A. Nicolai to authors (July 14, 2005, 22:49 EDT) (on file
with authors) (“I do not believe that any of the CEOs . . . intended from the start to engage in
fraudulent conduct . . . No, these people started down the slippery slope when they felt the pressure
from adverse results . . . so they thought it [okay] to fudge a little . . . ”).
32. See infra Part III (discussing the importance of situation in the corporate context). For an
overview of how we are affected by situational forces, see generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon,
The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics,
and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) and Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The
Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004)
(both describing the influence of situational forces on individuals’ decisions and in particular the
situational pressures of markets).
33. See, Carrie Johnson, Ebbers Gets 25-Year Sentence For Role in WorldCom Fraud, WASH.
POST, July 14, 2005, at A1 (noting also that WorldCom’s bankruptcy was the largest in U.S.
history).
34. Id.
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teacher and donated millions to local causes.35 This is not to excuse the
decisions of Ebbers or anyone else; their actions, while perhaps
understandable, are wrong. It should teach us that the solution to the
corporate governance problem is in one sense simple: instead of asking
how to “rehabilitate” these “bad actors,” we should think about how to
realign incentives and obligations so that the situational pressures push
directors and officers to do the right thing.
As one of us knows from decades of experience in law
enforcement, the importance of these incentives cannot be understated.
Some small number of people, in Corporate America or elsewhere, will
set out to break the law and will do so regardless of the regulatory
environment. Another small number will do the right thing, again
regardless of the prevailing winds. The overwhelming majority,
however, takes its cues from the external situation. A weak regulatory
response provides incentives for this large majority to skirt the law,
while a strong response encourages proper conduct, even without
prosecuting every instance of malfeasance. A social consensus around
positive governance promises much greater results than individual
policing could ever hope to accomplish.
B. The Role of Regulation
The role and nature of regulation depends critically on public and
political opinion regarding corporate governance. When strategizing for
the future, what executives should take from today’s corporate landscape
is that the subjects of corporate ethics and governance are most
definitely on the radar screen. As we have noted earlier,36 the continuing
debate over SOX, recent rules regarding hedge funds and mutual funds,
and class action and bankruptcy legislation all illuminate issues
regarding the relationship between government and business. Moreover,
Senator Sarbanes and Representative Oxley have announced their
resignations from Congress, and some believe the loss of these venerable
advocates of the law will adversely affect its future.37 Will these forces
culminate in a pro-industry revision of SOX that rolls back regulation?
Already, two committees are proposing revisions to SOX, hoping to
loosen regulation by introducing “broad new protections to corporations
and accounting firms against criminal cases brought by federal and state
prosecutors as well as a stronger shield against civil lawsuits from
35. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Fraud’s Many Helpers, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2005, at B1.
36. See supra note 11.
37. And some hope that it will. See Niskanen, supra note 20.
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investors.”38
Such a revision would be deleterious for the long-term prospects of
creating an ethical corporate culture. Strong regulatory mechanisms are
needed to establish a baseline of conduct for business leaders.39 Such
regulation not only penalizes wrongdoing but also protects those who act
properly. Without a regulatory baseline, well-governed companies are
worse off for their competitors’ wrongdoing. For example, WorldCom’s
fraudulent activity affected the entire telecommunications industry, as
competitors struggled to match WorldCom’s fictitious profits and
prices.40 In such a situation, everyone suffers: not only the managers and
executives who are unable to run their companies as well as they
mistakenly thought WorldCom was, but also employees who lose their
jobs and consumers who are left with a fragmented and unstable
telecommunications industry.41
The loud advocacy against reform comes as many are calling for
continued reform with equal vigor. And those yelling the loudest for
reform are not radicals from the far left — they are mutual fund
managers, institutional investors, and others in the mainstream business
world.42 Law firms, too, are emphasizing their experience in the
corporate governance field; plaintiffs’ firms are pushing for corporate
responsibility and accountability,43 while corporate defense firms tout
their counseling and litigation expertise.44 And there is evidence that, at
least in some corners, those calls for a more transparent, ethical culture
are being heeded. For example, Yahoo! Finance recently started

38. Stephen Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection on Legal Front, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2006, § 1, at 1 [hereinafter Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection]. See infra notes 135-47.
39. But see Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3, 18-61 (2003) (arguing against
regulatory responses to corporate fraud and suggesting that market mechanisms are best suited to
improve corporate governance).
40. See Belson, supra note 13.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Troy Wolverton, Shareholders Flex Muscles, THESTREET.COM, June 2, 2005,
http://www.thestreet.com/pf/stocks/troywolverton/10226152.html; Gretchen Morgenson, Sometimes
Investors Should Just Say No, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, § 3, at 1.
43. See, e.g., Milberg Weiss, Why Milberg Weiss, http://www.milbergweiss.com/
whymilberg/whymilberg.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2005) (describing the firm’s “unique position to
vigorously pursue all types of corporate wrongdoing”). It is worth noting that Milberg Weiss itself
has been indicted for allegedly illegal (and unethical) conduct. See Martha Neil, Milberg Weiss on
the Hot Seat, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 2006) at 34.
44. At risk of self-promotion, see, for example, Proskauer Rose, Proskauer Rose LLP –
Corporate Governance/Corporate Defense, http://www.proskauer.com/practice_areas/areas/093 (last
visited Aug. 8, 2006) (describing the firm’s ability to identify problems, work in appropriate internal
investigation and deploy defensive strategies).
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including a “Corporate Governance Quotient” on its company profile
webpages; now investors can have governance information at hand
while evaluating stocks.45 Senior executives at top companies have been
dismissed over ethical lapses, even in profitable times.46 The seeds of
good corporate ethics are starting to grow, albeit slowly. Nevertheless,
the sprouts are fragile and can be destroyed with the slightest wrong
move.
C. Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations
It is worth pausing to provide a more concrete example of the
general suggestions we have made thus far. In other words, how exactly
can we nurture these sprouts? How can regulation facilitate the
development of an ethical corporate culture?
The 2004 amendments to Chapter Eight of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines provide a good starting point.47 Chapter Eight is commonly
referred to as the “Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations,” or
FSGOs. The FSGOs articulate many of the same themes that we have
mentioned. For example, an organization can qualify for a downward
departure at sentencing if it had an effective compliance and ethics
program (“ECEP”).48 An ECEP must, inter alia, “promote an
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment
to compliance with the law.”49 Moreover, organizations are rewarded for
self-reporting, cooperating with authorities, and accepting responsibility
for wrongdoing.50 The FSGOs recognize the need for cooperation
between businesses and regulators, and shift the emphasis to preventing
criminal misconduct rather than merely punishing it.51
The FSGO example also illustrates how the dialogue between
business leaders and regulators can progress. For example, the
45. See, e.g., Yahoo! Finance, Profile for Yahoo Inc., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=YHOO
(last visited July 14, 2005) (providing “quotes and info” for Yahoo, Inc., including a Corporate
Governance Quotient).
46. See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr., On Wall Street, a Rise in Dismissals Over Ethics, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2005, at A1.
47. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (2006) (amended version at 2006 Supp. to
App. C, amdt. 673) [hereinafter USSG].
48. Id. at § 8C2.5(f)(1).
49. Id. at § 8B2.1.
50. Id. at § 8C2.5(g).
51. This is particularly important because it is impossible to prosecute every instance of
wrongdoing. If the real goal is deterrence, and not merely prosecution for its own sake, regulators
must create incentives for business leaders to do the right thing. In many cases, this would include
the threat of prosecution and punishment, but it should also include rewards for good faith efforts to
comply with the law.
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Association for Corporate Counsel (“ACC”) identifies several
shortcomings with the FSGOs in a 2005 white paper,52 but the paper
makes strides in acknowledging, and working within, the spirit of the
amendments. For example, the FSGOs require companies to report any
evidence of wrongdoing to the government within a reasonable time.53
The ACC instead recommends that the company either report such
wrongdoing or develop and implement modifications to the company’s
practices to remedy the situation.54
The merits of the ACC proposal are open to question. It is true that
implementing strong practices to remedy wrongdoing is more important
than merely reporting it. The converse concern is that a lack of reporting
encourages cover-ups and deceit. We take up this issue later.55 For now,
our intention is merely to point out that the ACC letter represents a type
of dialogue, and it is precisely this type of dialogue between business
and government leaders that is needed to foster developments in the
spirit of good governance and competition.56
Another concern of the ACC and others regarded the waiver of
attorney-client privilege.57 The ACC worried that “provisions now
codified in Chapter 8 . . . would make waiver of the attorney-client
privilege almost a certainty in order for a charged company to be
deemed ‘cooperative,’ and thus eligible for more lenient treatment in
settlement discussions or at sentencing.”58 A flashpoint for this
controversy was the so-called Thompson Memo, written in 2003 by
then-Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson.59 Corporations were
concerned that the Thompson Memo effectively required, inter alia,
waiver of the attorney-client privilege, even though the memo wrote that
52. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: What’s Up, ASS’N OF CORP.
COUNSEL, Feb. 2005, available at https://www.acca.com/protected/article/attyclient/sentencing.pdf
(on file with authors) [hereinafter ACC Letter].
53. USSG § 8C2.5(f)(2).
54. ACC Letter, supra note 52, at 12.
55. See infra Part IV (discussing what steps regulators should take).
56. Another good example of the way our argument would work in practice regards recent
regulation relating to expensing stock options. See our discussion of this subject in Part V below.
57. ACC Letter, supra note 52, at 1.
58. Id.
59. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General to Heads of
Department Components and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo]. The Thompson Memo has come
under heavy criticism from corporations. Judge Kaplan, of the Southern District of New York,
recently chastised prosecutors’ heavy-handed tactics on a related matter. See infra note 61. Yet,
overzealous prosecutors aside, it should be noted that the memo, by its terms, does not require such
action. The prosecutors seem to be affected by the aggressive, antagonistic environment; it is our
view that changing that environment will change the way prosecutors see their roles.
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waiver requests should be limited to “factual internal investigation[s]”
and emphasized that waiving privilege is not an “absolute requirement”
for being deemed compliant.60 Though this position is not ideal from
ACC’s perspective, it showed at least some degree of flexibility on the
part of the DOJ. Moreover, when prosecutors’ tactics in implementing
the provisions of the Thompson Memo became increasingly
overreaching, they were rebuffed by the courts.61 Thus the judicial
branch can step in to play a role in the dialogue we envision.62
The dialogue is in many ways ongoing. The FSGOs were revised
effective November 1, 2006; the new version deletes the reference to
waiver of attorney-client privilege in the section regarding culpability
score.63
Discontent over the Thompson Memo grew to such a pitch that the
Department of Justice issued a revision of the documents, now dubbed
the “McNulty Memo.”64 The McNulty Memo emphasizes that
prosecutors “may only request waiver of attorney-client or work product
protections when there is a legitimate need for the privileged information
to fulfill their law enforcement obligations. A legitimate need for the
information is not established by concluding it is merely desirable or
convenient to obtain privileged information.”65 Prosecutors’ requests for
waiver now require approval from several supervisors before a
corporation may be asked,66 and (presumably in response to Judge
Kaplan) when deciding if a company should be indicted, prosecutors are
instructed not to consider whether the company is paying employees’
attorneys’ fees.67 All of these changes make strides toward requests
made by corporations, although some argue the memo does not go far
enough.68
Indeed, in writing the memo, McNulty was careful to point out that
60. Id.
61. Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the Southern District of New York issued a scathing opinion in
which he criticized prosecutors’ tactics in the aftermath of the Thompson Memo. See United States
v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d. 330, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
62. Id.
63. Compare USSG § 8C2.5(g), cmt. 12 (Nov. 1, 2005) with USSG § 8C2.5(g), cmt. 12 (Nov.
1, 2006). The latter deletes the reference to waiver.
64. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General to Heads of Department
Components and U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/
2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memo].
65. Id. at 8 - 9.
66. Id. at 9-10.
67. Id. at 11.
68. See, e.g., Martha Neil, Thompson Memo Changes Not Enough, ABA Says, ABA J. EREPORT, Dec. 15, 2006, at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/d15specter.html.
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“the fundamental principles that have guided [the DOJ’s] enforcement
practices are sound.”69 The memo ostensibly did not change any of the
underlying principles of prosecution or enforcement; instead, it merely
clarified the role that waiver and payment of fees should play in
determining whether a corporation was cooperating with regulatory
authorities.70 We agree with the McNulty Memo that the fundamental
enforcement principles are sound. More than anything else, the McNulty
Memo sends a signal to prosecutors that they should exercise better
judgment and restraint in their work, and to this extent, we applaud it.
However, we are concerned that this, the FSGO amendments, and the
SEC’s new relaxation of SOX requirements71 are not the product of a
dialogue between groups, but rather the first step of many in rolling back
regulation. If it is in fact the latter, we are very concerned.72
Both the private and public sectors have been given a brief window
of opportunity. The salience of business issues in public policy and the
ability of businesses to influence that policy means that corporate
viewpoints are heard with unusual clarity. Simultaneously, the continued
focus on good governance means we are facing a new reality, and that
reality is here to stay. The puzzle lies in determining how to harness this
opportunity for the benefit of businesses, regulators and citizens and to
create a sustained, healthy and strong culture of corporate responsibility.
III. CHANGING THE CORPORATE CULTURE
In its credo, Johnson & Johnson says that it will “bear [its] fair
share of taxes.”73 This seemingly simple statement reveals a lot about the

69. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General to Heads of Department
Components and U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), at 1, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speech/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf (two-page accompanying memorandum preceding McNulty
Memo).
70. See McNulty Memo, supra note 64.
71. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
72. As an aside, it is interesting to ask why we say the company did not have a choice in the
waiver or fees context. Judge Kaplan calls this a decision made with the “proverbial gun to the
head.” See infra note 223. After all, they could just waive and get the credit, or not waive and accept
the consequences. Of course, this is a classic example of where choices are not really free and
constrained by situation. But what about elsewhere? Seeing the situational influences that affect
some (corporations) but not others (prosecutors) sheds light on whose perspective we take in a given
dispute. See id. (referencing Jon Hanson, who has made this point in a variety of contexts). We
would do well to pause and ask why we take the corporation’s perspective here, as opposed to the
prosecutor’s, when the prosecutors ostensibly are representing the public interest, not private
interests.
73. Johnson & Johnson, Our Credo, http://www.jnj.com/our_company/our_credo (last visited
July 14, 2005).
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nature of corporate America. While all companies (and individuals, for
that matter) seek to minimize their tax burden, taxes are nonetheless seen
as a routine part of doing business. Similarly, directors, managers,
executives, and employees must come to see ethical governance as part
of doing business, not as something outside the system that they need to
defend against.
This, of course, requires a shift in corporate culture, one that will
not be easy to accomplish. But the first steps are relatively selfexplanatory. After all, contemporary financial scandals often do not
involve complicated legal or financial maneuverings.74 This is lowhanging fruit, and when regulators see it they start to get hungry.
Corporations fear this and have criticized regulators like Eliot Spitzer for
going after companies too aggressively.75 Spitzer may have been
aggressive, but his attacks were brought on by the prevalence and
audacity of corporate malfeasance.
We use the term low-hanging fruit to mean two things. First, these
are easy targets for regulators. Second, and more important, these
instances of malfeasance are easy for business leaders to fix. It seems
that a typical reaction in a variety of regulated industries is to try and
“outlast” a regulator. Instead of trying to see if they can just outlast the
next aggressive regulator to come down the pike, directors and officers
should get ahead of the curve and start thinking about how to meet
regulators’ goals and add shareholder value.
For example, President Bush appointed Christopher Cox to succeed
Donaldson as Chairman of the SEC.76 Cox’s nomination prompted
speculation as to whether Chairman Cox will be “pro-business” or “antibusiness.”77 While an article noted his “long record . . . of promoting the
agenda of business interests,” a prominent plaintiffs’ lawyer said, “It’s
hard to think of a worse choice for the S.E.C.”78 These are simply the
wrong points. If businesses and regulators recognize their common goal,
an ethical, competitive, corporate culture, the entire frame of inquiry
shifts. For example, regulators will not need to “crack down” if
businesses take the lead in changing the corporate culture. Businesses
74. There are some who argue that Enron’s actions were not illegal, but merely complicated.
See Malcom Gladwell, Open Secrets: Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of too much Information,
THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 2007, at 44. Joe Nocera has strongly refuted this position. See Joe
Nocera, Tipping Over a Defense of Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2007, at C1.
75. See, e.g., Sorkin, supra note 16.
76. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Bush S.E.C. Pick Is Seen as Friend to Corporations, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Labaton, Bush SEC Pick].
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting William Learch).
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will not feel threatened by the SEC if they work proactively with the
agency in crafting rules in the future.79 Businesses should see the value
of such cooperation because well-managed firms take the brunt of the
injury when others act poorly. The goal should not be to maximize
prosecutions or minimize regulations; instead, the goal should be to
foster the kind of environment in which ethical conduct is rewarded.
These conflicts between personal and professional gain on the one
hand and ethical behavior on the other must be recognized and
addressed. They must be recognized by corporations because the market
is best-situated to identify and respond to these situations.80
A recent article critiques SOX for being a “regulatory response” to
corporate fraud and argues that “market responses” would be superior.81
The article suggests that markets are best-situated to address problems,
arguing that “contract and market-based approaches are more likely than
regulation to reach efficient results.”82 We agree with this sentiment, to
an extent. Regulations are necessary to establish the contours within
which “contract and market-based approaches” can operate. If corporate
actors know that unethical conduct will have significant legal (including
criminal) ramifications, then they will be less inclined to engage in such
conduct.83 Thus, strong regulations are necessary precisely to enable
contract and market-based approaches to operate in the right direction.84
During the 1990s, the incentives for corporate executives were to
fudge the numbers and engage in unethical conduct because the odds of
getting caught, and the costs if they were caught, were astonishingly
79. All too often, business respond during notice-and-comment rulemaking simply to suggest
that no new rules are necessary, instead of recognizing that rulemaking need not be a zero-sum,
either-or game. In doing so, they cheat themselves of a valuable opportunity to engage regulators.
For example, much of the early response from the corporate community was that compliance dates
for SOX should be delayed significantly — even for the largest companies — or that regulation was
unnecessary. See Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of
Non-Accelerated Filers and Newly Public Companies, Release Nos. 33-8760, 34-54942, File No.
S7-06-03, 2006 WL 3702644, at *6 (Dec. 15, 2006) [hereinafter SEC 33-8760]; U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Comments on Proposed Rule: Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406,
and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s74002.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
80. See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, supra note 6, at 23-32 (discussing the “meta script” of
corporate law, which argues that markets are generally preferred to regulation).
81. Ribstein, supra note 39, at 61.
82. Id. at 3.
83. See Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 24.
84. As one of us argues in a separate law review article, any sort of “free market” necessarily
involves interfering with individuals’ preferences to some extent — that is, any free market requires
a degree of regulation. The debate, then, should not be between “regulation” and “no regulation,”
but between the kind and degree of regulation that we will have. See Goutam U. Jois, Can’t Touch
This! Private Property, Takings, and the Merit Goods Argument, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 183 (2006).
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low.85 With such low costs and high benefits, tempted corporate
executives easily succumbed. We must reform the regulatory
environment to increase the costs of malfeasance so that market actors’
incentives push toward ethical conduct, not toward cheating the system.
Regulation can play a role beyond simple cost-benefit analysis as
well. Over time, regulations will become part of a corporation’s situation
and, as such, the costs and benefits will change the corporation’s very
culture. Regulation, often assumed to be exogenous, will over time
become endogenous as companies incorporate regulatory requirements
into their very idea of what it means to be in business.
This is not to say that regulation is perfect. For example,
corporations often complain, rightly, that SOX is something of a blunt
instrument: it fails to differentiate among firms, so that small- and midcap firms have to bear the same burden as Fortune 500 companies.86 But
the obvious flip side is that if executives and boards had taken the first
steps in self-regulation, SOX would have never been necessary. If there
had not been and did not continue to be a successive parade of
spectacular corporate debacles, these issues would have never come up.
Of course industry knows better than government what firms’ capacities
and needs are, but if corporate leaders fail to use that knowledge to
implement reforms, government will repeatedly step in to fill the void.
That void certainly exists. Nearly five years after SOX, companies
are still restating earnings on a regular basis, uncovering earlier
misconduct.87 Questions of executive compensation keep bubbling to the
surface — most recently with the stock options scandal and a new S.E.C.
rule,88 and individuals question why “personal responsibility” means one
85. This was especially the situation in Silicon Valley in the 1990s, when executives felt a
“sense of entitlement” and a “maverick culture” thrived, “where clever ways of gaming the system
were admired rather than excoriated.” Gary Rivlin & Eric Dash, Haunted by a Heady Past; Silicon
Valley was Calming Down. Now, an Options Scandal, N. Y. TIMES, July 22, 2006, at C1. In such an
environment, where even the “independent” lawyers and accountants were part of the problem, see
infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text, is it any surprise that malfeasance eventually came to
light?
86. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Here It Comes: The Sarbanes-Oxley Backlash, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2005, § 3, at 5 (discussing compliance costs generally); see also Matthew Keenan, In
Scandal Fallout, Small Firms Bear Big Burdens, BOSTON GLOBE, July 4, 2004, at C8 (discussing
compliance costs specifically for small firms).
87. See, e.g., Geraldine Fabrikant, Cablevision to Restate its Earning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2006, at C1.
88. See, e.g., Rivlin & Dash, supra note 85 (discussing options scandal); Jonathan Peterson &
Kathy M. Kristof, More Data on Pay at the Top is Mandated: The SEC Votes to Require MoreDetailed, ‘Plain-English’ Disclosure of Executive Compensation, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2006,
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/
MediaMentions/07-27-06_LAtimes.pdf (discussing new SEC rule); Jeanne Sahadi, CEO Pay: Sky
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thing when they go bankrupt and another thing when United Airlines
goes bankrupt.89 The independence of some boards is still suspect,90
while at the other extreme some boards are kept so far out of the loop
that they don’t even know of a pending merger.91 Silicon Valley, still
reeling from the dot-com bust, is now awash in scandals regarding
backdated stock options,92 a scandal that has reached to the heights of
some of the most highly-regarded tech firms, such as Apple
Computers.93 In an article in The New York Times, Joseph Nocera wrote
of the difficulty of changing a culture among accountants and predicted
that “you can pretty much count on another round of accounting
scandals.”94 Shortly thereafter, eight partners at KPMG were indicted for
creating illegal tax shelters that reaped them millions of dollars in fees,
while costing the government billions of dollars.95 KPMG avoided
imploding, just barely, but perhaps Nocera’s prediction has already
come true.
These vignettes are not the entirety of the problem; rather, they are
symptoms of a larger problem in corporate ethics. Ultimately, regulators
must set the framework and business leaders must enact policies to
foster an environment that nurtures integrity, not one that shuns it. To be
sure, laws and regulations are part of that environment: SOX, though
imperfect, pushes in the right direction.96 And consider the example
from the beginning of this section: by recognizing its obligation to pay a
“fair share of taxes,” Johnson & Johnson implicitly acknowledges that
paying taxes has been internalized. Taxes are part of the business
environment and factor into the company’s business judgments. Ethical
corporate governance has yet to attain that level of respect and
High Gets Even Higher, CNNMONEY, Aug. 30, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/26/news/
economy/ceo_pay/ (stating executive compensation generally).
89. See, e.g., Dale Russakoff, Human Toll of a Pension Default, WASH. POST, June 13, 2005,
at A1.
90. Gretchen Morgenson, Just a Friendly Group of ‘Independent’ Directors, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2004, § 3, at 1.
91. Gretchen Morgenson, A Merger? Anyone Tell the Board?, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, §
3, at 1.
92. See Rivlin & Dash, supra note 85.
93. See Markoff & Dash, supra note 22.
94. Joseph Nocera, Auditors: Too Few to Fail, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2005, at C1. See also
Troy Wolverton, The Big Four: Can’t Touch This?, THESTREET.COM, July 12, 2005,
http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/troywolverton/10231757.html.
95. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Charges are Tied to Tax Shelters; 8 Former Partners of
KPMG Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at C1.
96. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text. See also Scott Harshbarger & Robert
Stringer, Creating a Climate of Corporate Integrity, CORP. BOARD (May/June 2003) at 10 (noting
the role that SOX can play in fostering a “climate of corporate integrity”).
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significance in business culture.97
Simultaneously, we must recognize that there are limits to what
regulation can accomplish. It would be impossible to “regulate to
perfection” executive compensation schemes, board independence, and
subtle conflicts of interest because regulators do not have the time,
information, or capacity to do so. Thus, leadership is important on the
part of directors and officers as well as public officials.98 So are
partnerships between regulators and industries. Just as it is impossible to
“regulate to perfection,” it is also impossible to prosecute every single
wrongdoer. The best solutions come from cooperative efforts by
regulators and companies to identify a common goal — a competitive,
ethical corporate culture — and work collaboratively toward it.99
In the end, the theme is quite simple: we are looking for
accountability. The calls for integrity and accountability from politicians
are rightly loud and constant. Citizens and elected officials constantly
call on accountability from police officers, public school teachers, and
nonprofit leaders. Why do we not ask the same of the private sector?
IV. DELVING INTO SARBANES-OXLEY
In this section, we want to situate our general discussion of
corporate ethics in the specific context of SOX. First, 2006 marked a
year of extensive discussion, and some decisions, about the (in)famous
Section 404. Second, the unabated stream of corporate restatements and
continuing scandals of executive compensation raise questions about the
adequacy of the clawback provisions that currently exist in the law.
Finally, the trials of former corporate executives raise the issue of whitecollar crime generally, and the role of lawyers specifically.

97. At another level of abstraction, consider Chen and Hanson’s argument regarding the
importance of situation. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 6, at 127-149. Laws and regulations, far
from being external to the corporate world, are part of and shape the corporate situation. Id. Over
time, companies will internalize the laws and rules and their conduct will change. Id.
98. See generally Scott Harshbarger, Strengthening Democracy: The Challenge of Public
Interest Law, 56 ME. L. REV. 211 (2004) (discussing the importance of leadership and particularly
the role of lawyers). Cf. Ethical Dilemmas Associated With the Corporate Attorney’s New Role, 52
AM. U. L. REV. 655 (2003) (discussing the role of attorneys under SOX).
99. Something we find curious is that the principles and the rhetoric found in the criminal
prosecution context seems absent in the white-collar context. Those who call for “victim’s rights” in
cases of assault or rape, for example, are often loath to do so in the case of corporate misconduct.
Yet prosecution can be tough and smart, and we need not sacrifice our principles of justice and
fairness — and, indeed, welfare maximization — in the corporate context. Cf. Harshbarger, supra
note 98 (describing the Boston Safe Neighborhood Initiative).
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A. Section 404
The beginning of 2006 featured extensive debate, and some
rulemaking, about compliance with Section 404 of SOX, the so-called
internal controls regulations.100 Although all companies were to have
complied with Section 404 by 2005, the SEC repeatedly deferred the
effective date for smaller companies. Simultaneously, Chairman Cox
made it clear that smaller companies would not be wholly exempt from
the internal controls regulations.101 Eventually, the SEC promulgated
relaxed requirements for smaller companies.102
Many companies have complained about the requirements of
Section 404, particularly because it imposes disproportionate costs on
small and mid-sized firms.103 One commentator remarked that, “[l]ike
their peers at more sizable corporations, small-company executives must
also help their auditors adhere to . . . the requirement under [Section]
404 that external auditors must attest to and report on their clients’
assessments of internal controls.”104 While larger firms might spend as
little as 0.06% of sales on Section 404 compliance, a smaller firm with
less than $100 million in revenue might see costs averaging 2.55% of
sales.105 This, according to a trade association, amounts to a “major

100. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006). The text of Section 404 reads as follows:
(a) Rules required. The Commission shall prescribe rules requiring each annual report
required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78m or 78o(d)) to contain an internal control report, which shall—
(1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate
internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of
the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for
financial reporting.
(b) Internal control evaluation and reporting. With respect to the internal control
assessment required by subsection (a), each registered public accounting firm that
prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer shall attest to, and report on, the
assessment made by the management of the issuer. An attestation made under this
subsection shall be made in accordance with standards for attestation engagements
issued or adopted by the Board. Any such attestation shall not be the subject of a
separate engagement.
Id.
101. Kathleen Day, Sarbanes-Oxley Exception Denied; Small Public Companies Must Comply,
SEC Says, WASH. POST, May 18, 2006, at D2.
102. SEC 33-8760, supra note 79 (providing smaller businesses an extension through
December 31, 2007); Steven Labaton, S.E.C. Eases Regulations On Business, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2006, at C1 [hereinafter Labaton, SEC Eases Regulations].
103. See, e.g., David M. Katz, Smaller Than a Sarbox?, CFO.COM, March 24, 2005,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3764856.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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regressive tax on small and medium companies.”106
These costs are significant and can influence companies’ decisionmaking. Companies might put off expansion or growth plans to avoid
incurring costs in addition to Section 404 costs. Alternatively, and more
dangerously in the context of our Article, a company might be tempted
to “cut corners” in its Section 404 programs. For example, the company
might enact compliance policies and procedures that effectively exist
only on paper. An auditor might test the program, but the company
might not emphasize the controls or the need to report misconduct,
create a culture of compliance, and so on. Moreover, the provisions
might divert money from other programs that would better serve the
overall goal of fostering an ethical corporate culture. A small-cap firm
that spent a disproportionately high amount of money on Section 404
compliance might then be forced, for financial reasons, to forego
additional employee training, director orientation, or similar programs
designed to better orient employees toward a genuine focus on ethical
conduct.
We argue that regulators should be more accommodating of these
concerns and allow smaller firms (we use that term to mean nonaccelerated filers under 12b-2107) to be exempt from the primary
provisions of Section 404. Specifically, small firms’ external auditors
should not be required to attest to an evaluation of the company’s
internal controls. Instead, the auditor should merely verify the existence
of the controls and allow company executives to develop the controls in
a manner best fit for their company. However, the auditor should
conduct a regular (though not necessarily annual) “performance
evaluation” and evaluate the actual incidence of malfeasance within the
company. The current rules which require “design evaluation” correctly
place a priority on having systems in place. Smaller firms, however,
should place the emphasis on outcomes, good governance ex post, rather
than mere process ex ante.108
Additionally, company officers should have to certify changes to
procedures only annually, instead of quarterly.109 For many of these
entities, certifying officers have a good sense of what is happening in

106. Id. (quoting a study by the American Electronics Association).
107. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2006).
108. Cf. Final Rule: Management’s Report On Internal Control Over Financial Reporting And
Certification Of Disclosure In Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Release Nos. 33-8238, 34-47986, 80
SEC Docket 1014 § VII.E (Aug. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Final Rule] (distinguishing between
performance and design standards).
109. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15 (2006).
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their firms. Unlike larger firms where the upward flow of information
might be impeded, smaller firms’ executives are often in a better
position to foster an ethical corporate culture even in the absence of
formal policies. Process and quarterly certifications will do little to
improve that.
We do not, however, favor exempting small companies from
Section 404 altogether. First, we believe that all companies need
independent oversight and evaluation, not just large companies. Second,
we are not convinced that compliance costs are as crippling as some
critics make them out to be. For example, one article notes that
“compliance cost[s] for smaller companies [are] at around $1.2 million
for the first year of implementation.”110 They do not point out that costs
decline over time: “31% in 2005 for small companies, according to one
study.”111 As the author sardonically comments, “you wonder why our
bankruptcy courts are not clogged with companies made insolvent by
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs.”112 While regulators must recognize
that costs are high, business leaders must recognize that oversight and
accountability will inevitably involve cost. The question is one of the
degree of oversight and accountability that we will require — not
whether we will require them in the first place.
The costs of 404 compliance are well documented; the benefits less
so. AuditAnalytics, a company that analyzes audit statistics, unearthed
some interesting data regarding financial restatements over the past few
years. In 2005 and early 2006, although the total number of restatements
was up from the previous year, the increase is mainly among smaller
firms.113 Smaller accounting firms, which audit these smaller companies,
were in the past subject only to peer review.114 In a particularly
egregious example, the head of an auditing firm went to jail for covering
up an embezzlement scheme in a New York School District.115 “The
110. Jim DeMint & Tom Feeney, Common-Sense Changes, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2006, at
A18.
111. David Weidner, Investors and Executives Need Sarb-Ox: Now Isn’t the Time to Shelve
Post-Enron
Reforms,
MARKETWATCH,
June
21,
2006,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/sarb-ox-critics-have-short-termmemories/story.aspx?guid=%7B4CD2779F%2D126D%2D45F0%2D9CAE%2D4C3567B20909%7
D. This underscores the reality that businesses were under-investing in internal controls in the years
prior to SOX.
112. Id.
113. Floyd Norris, High and Low Finance: Forcing Reality in Accounting of Tiny Firms, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2006, at C1.
114. Id.
115. Id. See also Paul Vitello, Accountant Is Sentenced For Hiding Roslyn Thefts, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2006, at B4.
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peer review of his firm had looked at precisely that audit, and found no
problems.”116
Restatements are up among small firms because their auditors are
now subject to oversight by the SOX-created Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).117 Faced with external scrutiny,
those auditors are doing better work. Again, the vignette of the jailed
accountant demonstrates the utility of legal responses when “selfregulation” breaks down. In this case, the peer reviews of audit firms
were poor, approving even outright embezzlement.118 PCAOB’s
oversight has helped keep those outside auditors honest. More relevant
to this discussion, the newly-accountable auditors are more accurately
uncovering misconduct at smaller firms.119 Exempting small firms from
404 requirements would enable this misconduct to go unnoticed.
It is also worth noting that we do not find compelling another
criticism of SOX: that, as globalization continues to take root, issuers
will either feel obligated to adopt (inefficient) U.S. standards120 or not
list on American exchanges in the first place.121 As proof of the latter
proposition, SOX critics point out that although cross-border IPOs are at
an all-time high, “nine of every 10 dollars raised by foreign companies
in new stock offerings [in 2005] were raised abroad.”122 But will
companies really leave U.S. markets for greener pastures? Possibly, but,
as Nasdaq President & CEO Bob Grierfield notes, “a ‘race to the
bottom’ can only be self-defeating.”123 He points out that “ADRs fled
the American market in droves” in the 1980s after the SEC “tightened up
the 12(g)3-2b exemption” and that major American companies have
experimented with foreign listings, “only to be disappointed with the
results. The real lesson of the ‘80s is not how many companies fled from
regulation, but how many came back.”124 He predicts a similar aboutface following the latest furor over 404 requirements, and we find his
116. Norris, supra note 113.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. See, e.g., Harvey Pitt, Sarbanes-Oxley is an Unhealthy Export, FINANCIAL TIMES, June
21, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonspeakers.com/prod_images/pdfs/PittHarvey.
SarbanesOxleyIsAnUnhealthyExport.06.21.06.pdf.
121. Cf. Bob Greifeld, It’s Time to Pull Up Our SOX, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2006, at A14
(noting that criticism but ultimately not swayed by it). This is related to the critique that argues that
firms will either go private or simply not list in the first place to avoid regulation. See Emily
Thornton, A Little Privacy, Please, BUS. WK., May 24, 2004, at 74.
122. DeMint & Feeney, supra note 110.
123. Greifeld, supra note 121.
124. Id.
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argument compelling.125
The SEC has reasoned that it would be “inconsistent with the
purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to specify different requirements for
small entities”126 and has reinforced this belief recently.127 This
statement is not entirely correct. While different requirements might be
inconsistent with SOX’s aims, they are not necessarily inconsistent. If
they are designed, as our proposals are, in line with the overarching
impetus behind SOX and our Article, then modified requirements could
easily further the purposes of the Act.
Indeed, any revision of SOX, even for small companies, must
recognize the simple fact that regulation works. In the first half of 2006,
the eight largest accounting firms actually saw restatements drop by 31
125. See id. We also agree with Mr. Greifeld’s plan to “self-initiate” a race to the top so that
markets “can avoid overreaching regulation that constricts business and stifles initiative.” Id.
NASDAQ has, in this vein, created “a new market tier with the highest listing standards on the
planet.” His policy reflects one of our themes: if business leaders get ahead of the curve and selfinitiate, to use his term, proactive changes, regulators will be less likely to “crack down.” We do
not, however, agree with his proposal to exempt smaller companies from 404 altogether. Cf. id.
It is also worth noting the new chorus of anti-SOX commentators complaining that SOX forces the
world to adopt U.S. standards. See, e.g., Pitt, supra note 120. When the world converges in a “Race
to Delaware” in corporate law generally, this is seen as proof of the power of markets and the
validity of the consensus. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW
(1993); S. Samuel Arsht, Reply to Professor Cary, 31 BUS. LAW 1113 (1976) (critiquing the
position, initially put forth by Professor William Cary, that Delaware’s corporate law was creating a
“race to the bottom”). The idea is similarly raised in the recent report of the Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation. See Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report of the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Nov. 30, 2006 [hereinafter CCMR Report], at 1,
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (noting
that U.S. markets are less competitive compared with those abroad, because of SOX).
But if convergence is good elsewhere, why is convergence bad in the SOX context?
Conversely, if convergence is bad, we should seriously question the so-called Delaware consensus.
There is some literature on this subject. See, e.g., Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 588 (2003) (arguing that Delaware’s main competition in promulgating rules of corporate law
is the federal government, not other states). Yet in the SOX context, for some reason, the U.S.
regulatory regime is considered undesirable. We are unsure what to make of this dissonance, except
to point it out and speculate that, perhaps, what is really motivating the comments is not a reasoned
concern for what types of regulation may or may not be best for global markets, but instead, a
single-minded concern with what regulatory regime is good for business, and nothing more.
126. Final Rule, supra note 108.
127. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. Cf. Thornton, supra note 121 (noting the
pressure SOX regulations are imposing on companies to stay or return to private status/selling or
merging). Yet the benefits of Section 404 are well documented; compliance has improved internal
controls while cost decline over time. See Floyd Norris, Audit Law’s Costs Decline, Survey Shows,
N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2006, at C2. In the years since (some) companies have had to comply with
Section 404, the number of companies with material weaknesses in their internal controls has
declined significantly. Id. In short, costs decline over time and the law works. Businesses should
recognize the benefits of the regulation while the SEC should recognize the costs; our proposal does
both.
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percent from a year earlier.128 In contrast, “restatements more than
doubled in the same period for smaller firms.”129 This discrepancy is
attributed to Section 404: smaller firms have to comply with the new
rule; as a result, “someone is looking at those [smaller] firms for the first
time.”130 Moreover, evidence suggests that the restatements are being
analyzed carefully in deciding whether executives should be held
accountable.131 Only eight percent of CFOs were replaced when
restatements were the result of errors involving “highly technical”
judgments regarding derivatives,132 while thirty percent of CFOs were
replaced when restatements were the result of revenue recognition, “a
prime source of fraud.”133 And even the CCMR Report agrees that SOX
compliance costs decline over time.134
With some of the concerns about SOX in mind, two committees are
proposing regulatory changes in response to what they see as the
excessive burdens of the recent increase in regulation. Members of both
committees reported “that Section 404, along with greater threat of
investor lawsuits and government prosecutions, had discouraged foreign
companies from issuing new stock on exchanges in the United States in
recent months.”135 With the goal of increasing the “attractiveness” of
U.S. capital markets, the committees hope to loosen regulations by
introducing “broad new protections to corporations and accounting firms
against criminal cases brought by federal and state prosecutors as well as
a stronger shield against civil lawsuits from investors.”136 Many of the
proposals are being formed so that the S.E.C. and the Justice Department
could implement the changes by promulgating new regulations.137 Such
a strategy, the thinking goes, would obviate the need for new legislation
from Congress.
One committee was formed by the head of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the other by Harvard Law School professor Hal S. Scott.
The latter, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, released its
interim report on November 30, 2006 and has found that SOX has
increased regulation to the extent that it is hurting the competitiveness of
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Norris, supra note 127.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CCMR Report, supra note 125, at 47.
Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection, supra note 38.
Id.
Id.
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U.S. capital markets.138 In their report, the Committee cites the costs of
complying with Section 404 of SOX,139 uncoordinated state and federal
enforcement laws and activities,140 the elimination of countless jobs due
to the “criminal indictment of entire companies,”141 as well as the
costliness of private enforcement in the form of securities law class
action suits142 as major causes of the erosion of competitiveness.
Focusing on five categories requiring change, the Committee
offered recommendations to decrease regulation and litigation while
enhancing the rights of shareholders in order to improve the
competitiveness of U.S. markets.143 With regards to SOX, the
Committee advised implementation changes, particularly of Section
404.144 The Committee suggested that the SEC adopt a reasonable
materiality standard both for internal controls and financial statements145
and that the SEC and PCAOB adopt enhanced guidance on auditors’ role
and duties in testing for compliance with Section 404.146 The Committee
went on to say that if the revised Section 404 regulations were seen as
too burdensome for small companies even after the general reforms
outlined above are implemented, legislative revisions may be necessary
and, in this case, the SEC should recommend to Congress that small
companies be exempt from auditor attestation and be subject to a
different standard for management certification.147
138. See generally CCMR Report, supra note 125.
139. See id. at 125-27.
140. See id. at 68-69.
141. Id. at 85.
142. Id. at 72.
143. See id. at 1-22.
144. Id. at 115-35.
145. See id. at 131-32.
146. See id. at 132.
147. See id. at 133. The Committee also made a variety of suggestions not related to SOX. For
example, it recommended that shareholders receive increased rights, particularly through a change
in their voting from plurality to majority, by requiring shareholder approval of poison pills, and by
giving shareholders the ability to decide the manner in which disputes with their company would be
resolved. See id. at 93, 102-04, 105-06, 109-12. To improve the regulatory process, the Committee
suggests that the SEC and self-regulatory organizations better analyze the costs and benefits of new
rules, that they more usefully differentiate between wholesale and retail investors, that they
regularly test current rules according to the cost-benefit analysis, and that the SEC and other public
enforcement bodies improve their communication and coordinate their movements. See id. at 60-65,
67-68.
In the category of public and private enforcement, the Committee suggested greater clarity
for private litigation under Rule 10b-5 (for securities fraud), positing that the materiality and
scienter requirements are unclear. See id. at 80-81. Criminal enforcement, the Committee suggested,
should be a last resort, reserved for companies that have become criminal enterprises from top to
bottom. See id. at 85. Moreover, the Committee proposed that outside directors not be held
responsible for corporate malfeasance when such malfeasance was outside the scope of what they
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So what will happen in fact? The SEC has recently promulgated
new rules that were characterized as “a loose interpretation” of Section
404.148 The revised rules allow auditors to employ a “material risk”
standard, much like what the CCMR Report suggested, scrutinizing only
those internal controls that would carry a material risk of having an
adverse impact on financial statements.149
This SEC’s new material risk standard, we believe, does much to
reduce the compliance burden on small firms. It remains to be seen
whether the Section 404 revision (and the McNulty Memo, released at
approximately the same time150) are viewed as a compromise between
the two extremes — calling for a rollback of SOX and a maintenance of
the regime — or merely the first of many steps that reduce regulatory
requirements. If the latter, we worry that SOX’s protections may be
diluted to the point of inefficacy. If the former, then we cautiously
applaud a process that, at least in fits and starts, is starting to negotiate a
median path that recognizes the benefits of a regulatory baseline while
not imposing undue burdens on business.

might detect. See id. at 73. The interim report also suggested protecting outside board members
against liability when they rely in good faith on the audited financial statements, speculating that
otherwise, it would be difficult to attract independent directors to boards. See id. at 90-91.
Some of these suggestions are already being heeded. As of this writing, the S.E.C. had
filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court that would make it more difficult for shareholders to file
lawsuits against corporations. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 853 (No. 06-484).
Simultaneously, “the agency’s chief accountant told a conference that it was considering ways to
protect accounting firms from large damage awards in cases brought by investors and companies.”
Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Seeks to Curtail Investor Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at C1. These
reforms are ostensibly to help shareholders, but we are skeptical of such a claim.
A full analysis of, and response to, the CCMR report is beyond the scope of this Article,
and we are confident that others will take up this task in the upcoming months. However, it is worth
mentioning that the report takes a fairly harsh view of SOX specifically and regulation generally.
Although we believe that U.S. capital markets must be competitive with those around the world, we
also believe that the investor protections—tangible protections, such as regulation, as well as
intangible protections, such as a general faith in the viability of U.S. capital markets—offered by
U.S. markets are unparalleled. Cf. Griefeld, supra note 121 (noting that the real lesson in the 1980s,
after U.S. markets tightened regulation, was “not how many companies fled from regulation, but
how many came back”). Relaxing SOX requirements and making securities fraud lawsuits difficult
might empower managers and increase their discretion to act in a relatively unfettered manner. We
are not, however, convinced that doing so will serve the immediate goal of improving investor
confidence in U.S. markets. We are even less convinced that doing so will serve the overall goal of
nurturing a new culture of corporate governance in which the emphasis is on ethical conduct and not
on wide-ranging discretion for managers with diminished oversight. Indeed, the burden of this
Article is to challenge these arguments, and to provide an alternative.
148. SEC 33-8760, supra note 79; Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection, supra note 38.
149. SEC 33-8760, supra note 79, at 6; Labaton, SEC Eases Regulations, supra note 102.
150. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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B. Clawback Provisions
If Section 404 perhaps goes too far in certain regards, Section 304
does not go far enough.151 Section 304 provides a rather weak “clawback
provision,” by which a company may recoup compensation paid to
executives after malfeasance.152 Specifically, if an issuer of securities
files an earnings restatement because of misconduct resulting in
“material noncompliance” with financial reporting requirements, then
the CEO and CFO are required to reimburse the issuer for (1) bonuses
and other compensation received in the twelve months following the first
filing of financials subject to a restatement; and (2) any profits derived
from the sale of the issuer’s securities during those twelve months.153
We argue that these provisions are extraordinarily weak. SOX
recognizes that top executives set the tone in a company and that
corporate culture depends critically on executives’ willingness to take
responsibility for their company’s actions.154 If executives are truly to
have an incentive to manage a company ethically, they should forfeit pay
when material noncompliance happens on their watch. After all, Section
302 requires executives to attest to the truthfulness of their company’s
statements.155 An earnings restatement necessarily means that earlier
financials, to which the executive attested, were wrong.156
Thus, SOX’s clawback provisions should be strengthened. The
executives should forfeit compensation from the initial financial report
until present, not just twelve months forward.157 Moreover, the provision
151. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7243 (2006) (SOX § 304).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (2006) (SOX § 302) (requiring company executives to
personally certify and take responsibility for, inter alia, the accuracy of reports, the existence of
internal controls, and appropriate disclosure).
155. Id.
156. At least three courts seem to have held that CEO and CFO certification, without more, is
insufficient to constitute scienter under the securities laws for a securities fraud violation. See In re
Watchguard Sec. Litig., No. C05-678J, 2006 WL 2038656, at *12 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 12, 2006); In
re Invision Technologies, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C04-03181 MJJ, 2006 WL 538752, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 27, 2006); In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV04-1255-AA, 2006 WL
538756, at *12, *15 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2006). However, this is, at least arguably, distinct from the
position we are advocating above. Disgorgement was always a remedy at common law and under
the securities laws. SOX’s clawback provisions must be distinct from those causes of action;
otherwise, § 304 would be superfluous. We argue here that CEO and CFO certification should be
sufficient to demonstrate knowledge for § 304 clawback purposes. In the case of regular securities
fraud actions, for example under Rule 10b-5, more may be required to properly allege scienter and
survive a motion to dismiss, as happened in Watchguard and Invision.
157. Except, of course, for the unlikely cases where the time frame was less than twelve
months, in which case they should forfeit pay for the full twelve-month period.
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should be triggered by material noncompliance with any securities laws,
not just financial reporting requirements. Additionally, executives could
be required to reimburse some percentage of their salary greater than
100%. For example, executives might be required to reimburse issuers
125% of their compensation and then pay a fine to the SEC of an
additional 25%, bringing total fines to 150% of all compensation (salary,
bonus, and equity). Finally, there should be an explicit private right of
action under Section 304, so that enforcement of the provision does not
depend solely on the SEC’s discretion.158
This is particularly important because so many executives receive
equity compensation. And while one argument suggests that stock
options align the incentives of executives and shareholders — namely,
increasing shareholder value — empirical evidence suggests that this
might not be the case. Executives, instead of working for the benefit of
shareholders, have an incentive to increase a company’s short-term value
and exercise their options regardless of long-term consequences. A 2005
study found that executives who received “substantial amounts of in-themoney options . . . were more likely to issue financial statements with
non-GAAP accounting irregularities.”159 The recent stock options
scandal only increases the possibility of more malfeasance.160 In other
158. Cf. 15 U.S.C. 7244 (2006) (SOX § 306) (explicitly affording a private right of action in
the insider trading context). A similar provision could create a private right of action here.
A variety of federal district courts have considered the issue and found that there is no
private right of action under Section 304. See, e.g., Kogan v. Robinson, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1076
(S.D. Cal. 2006); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (concluding that
“Congress did not intend to create an implied [private] right of action in Section 304”); In re BiSys
Group, Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding the same,
“substantially for the reasons stated in Neer”); In re Whitehall Jewellers, Inc. S’holder Derivative
Litig., No. 05-C-1050, 2006 WL 468012, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2006); In re Digimarc Corp.
Derivative Litig., No. 05-1534, 2006 WL 2345497, at *2-3 (D. Or. Aug. 11, 2006) (same). As of
this writing, no U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal has issued a decision. See In re Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. Derivative Litig., No. 5:03CV2180, 2007 WL 43557, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 5, 2007)
(noting that at least three cases have been docketed, but none has resulted in a decision). Although
an argument can be raised that an implied private right exists under Section 304 using the four-part
test from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); see, e.g., Pl’s Memo. of Law in Opp’n to Defs’ Second
Motion to Dismiss Pl’s Amended S’holder Derivative Complaint at 19, Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp.
2d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (No. 2:04-cv-4791-SD), and though we believe this argument has merit,
Section 304 should be revised to make this explicit. In the interim, the SEC should be aggressive in
pursuing the disgorgement remedy under this section — thus far, it has not done so even once. See
Pl’s Memo. of Opp’n to Defs’ Second Motion to Dismiss Pl’s Amended S’holder Derivative
Complaint at 17-19, Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (No. 2:04-cv-4791-SD).
159. Jap Efendi et al., Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role
of In-The-Money Options and Other Incentives 33 (Working Paper Series, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=547922.
160. At least one commentator has suggested that the backdating scandal is nothing more than
run-of-the-mill securities fraud: the executives are essentially “lying to someone to get [him] to hold
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words, equity compensation increases agency costs that must then be
borne by shareholders.161 Shareholders must be reimbursed not only for
the dollar value of the fraud but for these other, indirect, costs as well.
For this reason, we propose stricter clawback provisions, including
punitive damages mechanisms.
1. Boards of directors
Our discussion of clawbacks requires an argument for stronger
boards of directors more generally. This examination in turn illuminates
the dynamic between boards and executives, especially in the realm of
compensation. In their recent book, Lucian Bebchuck and Jesse Fried
argue that executives are essentially getting “pay without
performance.”162 Simultaneously, while executive compensation has
been rising, effectively linking pay to performance has proven elusive.163
On the one hand, granting executives stock options seems to give them
an incentive to increase shareholder value. But equity compensation and
the likelihood of an earnings restatement are positively correlated,
the company’s stock or buy more.” Posting of Broc Romanek to http://www.deallawyers.com/blog
(Aug. 7, 2006) (citing Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 195, 197 (2003)), for the definition of fraud: “lying to someone to get them to give you their
stuff”). Though this view seems not to have caught on, if it did, presumably shareholders would
have the full panoply of causes of action and remedies available to them, including under the
securities laws and common law fraud. It is worth noting, however, that at press time, two
Delaware courts have ruled that directors may be liable for “well-timed” stock options. See In re
Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 1106-N, 2007 WL 416132 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6,
2007); Ryan v. Gifford, C.A. No. 2213-N, 2007 WL 416162 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2007). It is, of
course, an open question whether the directors will actually be held liable or whether the promise of
reform will be merely illusory. At least one law firm thinks that although the decisions will be
“much-ballyhooed,” like the Disney decision, see infra notes 164-65, “it may be that such
complaints will survive motions to dismiss but not give rise to actual liability when litigated to
conclusion.” Robert A. Profusek et al., Two Delaware Chancery Court Cases on Backdating and
Spring-Loading
Options
Increase
the
Stakes
for
Directors,
http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S3993 (last visited March 1, 2007).
161. Id.
162. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). Professor Bebchuk has been active of late,
lambasting problems over high compensation, lack of shareholder rights, and most recently,
backdated options. In an op-ed, he wrote, “For corporate America to improve its governance going
forward, boards should face up to – and fully share with shareholders – past governance problems in
their companies.” Lucian Bebchuk, Inside Jobs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2007, at A6 [hereinafter
Bebchuk, Inside Jobs]. We wholeheartedly agree.
163. See Claudia H. Deutsch, My Big Fat C.E.O. Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, § 3, at
1. Providing non-equity compensation does not provide executives with an incentive to increase
shareholder value, while providing equity compensation in the form of stock options only provides
an incentive to boost the stock’s short-term price, which is generally not in line with shareholders’
interests. Id.
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suggesting that the way options are granted is flawed.164 For this reason,
we suggest aggressive clawback provisions. Thus, no matter how an
executive is compensated, he will be held to account if things go poorly.
But boards should make responsible decisions even when things are
going well. A recent court case held that the Disney board of directors
was not liable for an outlandish compensation package that it paid to
Michael Ovitz, holding that the plan, while extravagant, was within the
bounds of the “Business Judgment Rule.”165 Here, the directors escaped
unscathed. The Chancellor wrote:
[I]t is perhaps worth pointing out that the actions (and the failures to
act) of the Disney board that gave rise to this lawsuit took place ten
years ago [around 1995 and 1996], and that applying 21st century
notions of best practices in analyzing whether those decisions were
actionable would be misplaced.166

That reasoning is open to debate on the merits; for example, we
believe that the board should have been responsible under theories that
do not necessarily turn on twenty-first century notions of best practices
such as breach of fiduciary duty or waste of corporate assets. However,
it is quite clear that as increasing numbers of executives and others come
under scrutiny for more recent malfeasance — such as John and
Timothy Rigas, Bernard Ebbers, Richard Scrushy, the KPMG partners,
Fannie Mae, and others — the Chancellor’s reasoning no longer holds.
All business leaders today know about the new realities of corporate
governance, and their conduct should be held to the highest ethical and
legal standards. Defendants in the next round of shareholder derivative
actions should not be allowed to avoid responsibility by claiming that
corporate governance was not “on the radar” at the time. As we have
repeatedly pointed out, it is on the radar, and it is here to stay.
The Wall Street Journal’s 2006 report on executive compensation
illustrates the need for informed, engaged boards of directors. Using a
new tool called “tally sheets,” boards are finally able to calculate exactly
how much their CEOs are making.167 The sheets are “[n]icknamed ‘holy
cow’ sheets for the way they often expose the immense worth of current
and potential payouts.”168 The sheets give boards a heretofore absent
ability to forecast total compensation under different scenarios covering
164. See Efendi, supra notes 159, at 31, 33.
165. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 15452, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *3 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 9, 2005).
166. Id. at *4.
167. Joann S. Lublin, Adding It All Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at R1.
168. Id.
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salary, bonuses, stock options, pensions, and other remuneration.169
The remarkable thing is that tally sheets have been absent from the
corporate landscape for so long. Indeed, among the 350 firms featured in
the Journal’s report, only fifty boards were using tally sheets.170 Of the
balance, it is an open question as to how many boards are unaware of the
“holy cow” nature of their executives’ pay.
The tally sheets vignette illustrates just one of the many ways in
which boards must become more actively engaged and empowered to
monitor the performance of their CEOs. Recently, the backdating of
stock options, an alarmingly pervasive practice, seems to be the scandal
du jour.171 Initially thought merely to pad executives’ pockets, now it
appears that “executives may have changed the so-called exercise
date . . . to avoid paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in income
tax.”172 Again, boards are confronted with the question: are corporate
executives going to continue to get “pay without performance?”
Independent oversight is critical, both from government and watchdog
groups as well as independent, empowered directors. When these
controls break down, excess and scandal are only a matter of when, not
if.
As we noted earlier, it is impossible for regulators and courts to
monitor every instance of improper executive compensation or
performance. Boards, then, become one of the first lines of defense
against these excesses. They can only do their jobs if they are strong,
empowered, sufficiently independent, and accountable.
C. The Role of Professionals
In a speech in 2004, one of us remarked:
[W]hat also leaps out at me is that in nearly every single transaction at
WorldCom, Enron, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco, Qwest, and any
of the other leading examples of serious corporate problems involving
crime, fraud, schemes, and malfeasance, in all those cases, there was a
lawyer who, at some level, saw, heard, reviewed, analyzed, and billed
for legal services rendered. What did we see? What did we do? What

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Rivlin & Dash, supra note 85; Damon Darlin & Eric Dash, 2 Are Charged in Criminal
Case on Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2006, at A1.
172. Eric Dash, Dodging Taxes is a New Wrinkle in the Stock Options Game, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 2006, at C1.
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should we do now?173

These questions regarding the role of lawyers specifically and of
professionals generally are of utmost importance in setting the future
course of corporate governance and ethics in this country. This begins
with SOX’s requirements for public companies to have audits conducted
by independent accountants174 and for lawyers to report evidence of
illegal activity to the company’s executives and independent directors.175
These requirements are important when juxtaposed against the
questions posed in the quotation at the beginning of this section. Indeed,
the current options backdating scandal once again raises questions about
lawyers and accountants and how they did — or did not — fulfill their
professional roles. The backdating scandal is so jarring that commentator
Ben Stein compares it to “pick[ing] lottery numbers after the winning
numbers are drawn — and your stockholders supply the prize money.”176
A prominent Silicon Valley law firm has come under suspicion, and
accounting firms are not escaping unscathed.177 Earlier, we discussed
how WorldCom’s actions led to a race to the bottom that affected the
entire telecommunications industry.178 Similarly, the heady days of the
dot-com boom compromised lawyers’ and accountants’ independent
judgment. Accounting firms’ work, one commentator noted, became
“client-driven . . . with the accounting firm saying ‘Sounds O.K. to me’
without exercising proper oversight.”179 The same was true for law
firms; instead of keeping companies honest, they caved to the
“enormous pressure . . . to keep their newly minted clients happy.”180
This, of course, reinforces our theme in this Article. Just like the
corporate executives, the lawyers and accountants did not set out
intending to do evil — to whitewash companies’ dubious practices.
Instead, market pressures forced them to accommodate their high173. Harshbarger, supra note 98, at 221.
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) & (l) (2006) (SOX §§ 201, 206) (describing “prohibited
activities” and “conflicts of interest” provisions, respectively).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) (SOX § 307) (Rules of Professional Responsibility for
Attorneys).
176. Ben Stein, So Many Millions, So Little Body Armor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007, § 3, at 3
(emphasis added). Stein notes that the backdating problem is “precisely an example of a failure of
internal controls,” thus undercutting the argument in the CCMR report that SOX “was supposedly
too strict in requiring audits of internal controls.” Id. We completely agree with this sentiment, and
it dovetails with our general observation that the calls for relaxing regulation might be more credible
if there were not a steady stream of continuing corporate misconduct.
177. See Rivlin & Dash, supra note 85.
178. See Belson, supra note 13; see also supra text accompanying notes 8-15 and 40-41.
179. Rivlin & Dash, supra note 85.
180. Id.
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profile, “rock star” clients, and in the process, they compromised the
very judgment and independence that is their stock-in-trade.
Professionals play an important role in fostering an ethical
corporate culture. Accountants, lawyers, independent directors, and
others have the best access to a company’s policies and procedures and
are almost always in a better position to find and correct malfeasance
before regulators. Indeed, by the time a government agency comes to
know of fraud, it is generally too late: shareholders, citizens, and
communities have already been harmed in some way. In contrast, the
professionals providing services to these corporations should have
firsthand knowledge of where the company’s practices are suspect and
where it might face risks.
In cases of malfeasance this raises two equally undesirable
possibilities. On the one hand, the professionals might have been so
inept that they were wholly unaware of the malfeasance that was taking
place. On the other hand, and probably worse, the professionals were
fully aware of the overstatements, the conflicts of interest, the insider
trading, and blessed it anyway—collecting their fees and stamping their
approval.181
A recent article points out that the government considers lawyers
the “first line of defense” with regard to white-collar crime.182 Lawyers
are generally in the best position to notice and curtail such crime.
Moreover, lawyers can counsel their clients as to how best to avoid legal
problems (as well as how to solve them when they occur). Professional
associations for lawyers and accountants should establish high standards
of conduct that go even farther than Section 307 in requiring members to
work aggressively to deter and then report malfeasance. In exchange for
doing so, the individuals and organizations involved should get
immunity from government prosecution. Moreover, in the event of
related litigation with the government, the disclosure of such
wrongdoing, even if done by third-party professionals, should serve as a
mitigating factor when considering what penalties to assess against the
corporation. This demonstrates how the relationship between regulators,
corporate leaders, and professionals can and should be directed to foster
an ethical, competitive corporate culture — not merely for regulators to
181. Cf. Harshbarger, supra note 98, at 221 (“Is it okay if we simply didn’t know what our
clients were doing? Were we like the New York Stock Exchange Board—either we knew the facts
and felt they were perfectly okay, or at least didn’t cross any legal boundary, or, on the other side,
which is probably worse, did we not know or want to know what was occurring, and yet we took
our fees?”).
182. See Richard M. Strassberg et al., Lawyers on Trial, 234 N.Y. L.J. 9 (2005).
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punish all executives or for all corporations to see how they can skirt or
otherwise evade the law.183
V. THE VALUE OF AN ETHICAL CULTURE
The obvious question is whether our call for an ethical corporate
culture is somehow disjointed from the typical concerns of a business. In
this Article, we call for corporations to embrace a broader view of what
it means to do business, including ethical governance. Is this prescription
at odds with what it means to increase shareholder value? A variety of
research indicates otherwise.
An ethical culture simply makes good business sense. The problem,
as we have outlined above, is not with “corporate governance,” as some
narrowly define it. We are not interested in some ranking, a number
tacked on after a ticker symbol — a number that may or may not mean
anything.184 Instead, we are interested in a broad-based shift toward an
ethical corporate culture: a shift that ultimately makes money.
This might be intuitive:185 an ethical company is less likely to run
183. One major issue that corporations face in cooperating with regulators involves the waiver
of attorney-client privilege. Specifically, corporations that turn over certain documents to regulators
are often deemed to have waived the privilege, even when “limited waiver” agreements exist; every
court except the Eighth Circuit has rejected such arrangements, arguing that any disclosure, even to
a regulator, waives the privilege. See Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 607, 611 (8th
Cir. 1978) (recognizing limited waiver); but see In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179,
1192-1193 (10th Cir. 2006) (rejecting selective waiver); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d
1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same). In the federal courts, questions of privilege are governed by
federal common law. See FED. R. EVID. 501. We support the proposed Rule 502, which would allow
for limited waiver. Under this scenario, companies could disclose information to regulators, work to
solve what problems exist, but be permitted to assert the privilege as to those documents and those
subjects in litigation against private plaintiffs. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE SUBMITTED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT, A SUMMARY FOR BENCH AND BAR (August 2006),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Brochure_2006.pdf; Report from Hon. Jerry E. Smith,
Chair, Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Committee
on
Rules
of
Practice
and
Procedure
(June
30,
2006),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Excerpt_EV_Report_Pub.pdf.
We of course understand (particularly as one of us has taught legal ethics for decades) that
these issues, involving lawyers’ duties and obligations, are complex; we do not try to do the topic
justice here. It is, nonetheless, a critical part of the new reality, and professionals must do more than
use their duties as a shield. There are affirmative obligations, as well as opportunities, for lawyers,
accountants, auditors, and others to offer real, independent, and strategic advice. These
professionals, as always, play an integral role in the reform we envision.
184. See, e.g., Corporate Governance by the Numbers: It Doesn’t Work,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Sept. 22, 2004, available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article/1041.cfm.
185. Or it might not. If the costs of crime — the magnitude of punishment times the odds of
getting caught — are low, then crime does pay, and either the costs, odds, or both would need to be
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into financial, accounting, or legal trouble. Less trouble means lower
costs associated with trouble; lower costs mean more profits in the long
run. But this is not just armchair philosophy; good ethics can mean more
money in the short run as well. GovernanceMetrics International (GMI)
recently examined governance practices at 3,220 companies
worldwide.186 The companies that received GMI’s highest rating
outperformed the S&P 500 by an average of over 11% for the 12 months
ending February 28, 2005.187
GMI’s study offers more than just hindsight. For example, Krispy
Kreme recently lost 81% of its value after its accounting practices came
under scrutiny.188 After an investigation, a special committee of Krispy
Kreme’s board of directors concluded that the company “failed to meet
its accounting and financial reporting obligations to its shareholders and
the public.”189 The committee attributed this failure directly to a
“corporate culture driven by a narrowly focused goal of exceeded
projected earnings by a penny each quarter.”190 How would GMI’s data
have affected this failure of corporate ethics? “In June 2003,
GovernanceMetrics gave Krispy Kreme relatively low marks for its
[corporate governance] policies, raking it 4 out of 10 overall. Then, in
January 2004, [GMI] dropped its rating to 2.5. In July, Krispy Kreme
disclosed that securities regulators were investigating its accounting.”191
Krispy Kreme’s accounting fraud was foreshadowed by GMI’s ratings.
Another study similarly links good governance and shareholder
value, finding that companies with strong shareholder rights yielded
annual returns that were 8.5% higher than companies with weak
shareholder rights.192 When discussing the study, one of the co-authors
indicated surprise at the findings. “As a financial economist,” he said, “I
expected important things like governance already reflected in stock
prices and therefore wouldn’t see much of a difference. We found
otherwise.”193 His comment is important for two reasons. First, it
reinforces GMI’s conclusion that good governance yields returns for
increased.
186. Gretchen Morgenson, Companies Behaving Badly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, § 3, at 1.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc., Krispy Kreme Announces Completion of Special
Committee Investigation (Aug. 10, 2005),
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=120929&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=741862&highlight.
190. Id.
191. Morgenson, supra note 186.
192. Gompers et al., supra note 5, at 109.
193. Studies Show Impact of Governance Practices, N.Y.S.E. NEWSLETTER, June 2003,
available at http://www.nyse.com/content/articles/1054291475066.html (emphasis added).
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shareholders. But it also represents a deeper point. Throughout this
Article, we have argued that corporate leaders must see good governance
as endogenous to the business process that is, as a normal part of doing
business. Metrick essentially assumed that they already did — hence his
intuition that governance practices would already be reflected in stock
price.194 The fact that governance was not reflected in stock price
confirms our argument: the empirical data indicate that neither business
leaders nor investors are yet factoring governance into their business
decisions.195
Another example from 1999 demonstrates the positive relationship
between good governance and financial success. The World Trade
Organization’s meeting in Seattle, Washington, that year was besieged
by protestors and collapsed in short order.196 Soon thereafter, many
corporations’ stock prices took a hit.197 But that fate did not befall all
companies equally.198 In industries known for environmental problems
(such as energy, steel, and mining) and labor abuses (such as apparel,
toys, and sporting goods), those companies with a reputation for social
responsibility did better than those without.199 While the companies
without such a reputation saw stock prices drop by an average of over
3%, the companies with a reputation for social responsibility saw their
prices decline only slightly.200 Along the same lines, a June 2003 article
in the New York Stock Exchange Newsletter surveyed a variety of
studies from markets around the world that all point to the same
conclusion: good governance means good business.201
And these financial benefits parallel similar legal benefits. A
company with a strong ethical culture is less likely to lose a lawsuit or
have to pay out millions in a settlement. Of course, some people will still
file lawsuits primarily to harass a company, but when those situations
come up a company can be relatively more secure knowing that it
194. Id.
195. Unlike, say, taxes, which we have discussed earlier. See supra note 73 and accompanying
text. Note also that GMI’s data also indicates that corporate governance is currently treated as
exogenous to the business process. Since GMI’s metric for Krispy Kreme was declining before
stock price declined, we can infer that the elements of good governance were not already reflected
in stock price, just as the Gompers study found. Gompers et al., supra note 5, at 146. In other words,
the market is (at least in those examples) not acting on the governance information available to it.
196. Marguerite Rigoglioso, In Bad Times, It Pays to Be Good: A Reputation for CSR May
Shied Companies From the Public’s Ire, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2005, at 14.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See supra note 193.
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ensured independence, minimized conflicts of interest, and had its
governance structures independently evaluated. In other words, the firm
would have less to fear, since it had stayed ahead of the curve from the
beginning and not simply waited until a crisis came along.202
In short, an ethical, transparent culture is not only the right thing to
do but also acts as a prophylactic that protects everyone, from CEOs and
boards to employees, investors, and other stakeholders. Indeed, any
company might (and often will) encounter unethical or even illegal
conduct. The key is to proactively discover these transgressions and to
ensure that the isolated act does not become a pattern. Expecting
employees to identify and correct irregularities immediately, before the
regulators and lawmakers find out, will foster a sense of openness.
Executives in particular can rest assured that problems will be remedied.
After all, it is nearly impossible for a single CEO to know everything
that is happening or might happen in a huge conglomerate. An executive
should be able to trust her employees to prevent and eliminate
malfeasance and should get support from the board for setting such
expectations.
Finally, the example of Tyco indicates both the good and the bad
about corporate reform. There, executives’ wrongdoing resulted in a
drop in stock price of roughly 80%.203 However, an aggressive internal
investigation pushed for civil and criminal suits against the wrongdoers
and found no evidence of systemic fraud.204 As a show of good faith, the
company replaced all of its senior executives and instituted a
comprehensive ethical program.205 On the one hand, this illustrates
effective handling of a serious problem through internal investigation,
effective outside counsel, and cooperation with government regulators.
On the other hand, these changes only came after Tyco was on the brink
202. Cf. U.S.S.G. § 8B2.1(b)(1) - (7) (outlining an ECEP). See also FED. R. EVID. 501, supra
note 183, annot. 502. Under limited-waiver agreements, companies that did detect, disclose, and
remedy misconduct would be protected against private litigants.
203. Hiawatha Bray, Tyco to Cut Jobs, Consolidate Troubled Company is Hoping to Save
$125M Annually, Trim $27B Debt load Tyco to Sell Buildings, Aircraft, Pay Debt, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 14, 2002, at D1.
204. See generally Brooke A. Masters, Tyco Finds $1.3 Billion in Accounting Errors, WASH.
POST, May 1, 2003, at E04.
205. See generally Tyco Fraud InfoCenter, http://www.tycofraudinfocenter.com/
information.php (last visited July 14, 2005). See also DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE 235, 467
(2004) (describing the proactive role his firm took in representing Tyco, voluntarily disclosing
wrongdoing to the government and fully cooperating with government investigations). Boies and his
firm did come under fire for declaring Tyco “clean” before all of the malfeasance was uncovered.
See Floyd Norris, Joy for Tyco’s New Boss, Not for Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2003, at C1;
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Tyco Inquiry Mostly Clears Its Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2002, at C4.
Again, the important role that professionals play is clear.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007

39

Akron Law Review, Vol. 40 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 1
HARSHBARGER & JOIS

40

3/26/2007 12:05:05 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[40:1

of destruction. The puzzle for the future is determining how to get Tycostyle reforms without a Tyco-style crisis.
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF SITUATION
In trying to solve that puzzle, there is one important fact to keep in
mind. As described above,206 none (or at least nearly none) of the nowdisgraced CEOs set out to defraud people or do evil. Instead, “they
started down the slippery slope when they felt the pressure from adverse
results — declining sales, unexpected adverse rulings by a regulator, etc.
— and they began to realize that the expectations that they had
created . . . could not be met. So they thought it okay to fudge a little. . . .
Then, as the business conditions worsened, they succumbed to the
temptation to fudge more and pretty soon they understood that they were
engaged in significant wrongdoing.”207
These pressures, these temptations, are what Professor Hanson and
his co-authors have described as situational forces.208 They have written
extensively on the subject of situationism and have articles (both
published and forthcoming) on situationism in corporate law.209 While it
is not our intention to delve into an extensive situational analysis of
corporate governance here, it is worth noting that the issues we raise
intersect with work on situationism at a variety of levels. At the most
basic level, we call for business leaders and regulators working
collaboratively to create the situational forces to align incentives in such
a way that fosters ethical conduct.
Until we do so, and until we abandon the myopic “rational actor
model,” our policy prescriptions are doomed to fail. Consider the issue
of executive pay. It was originally thought that CEOs should be paid a
bonus to foster proper conduct: if the company did poorly, the executive
would not receive a bonus, so the incentive would be to improve
performance. Yet problems continued. Then, boards hit on the idea of
stock options: by making executives also shareholders, they would
internalize any costs they were previously externalizing on the company.
But stock options were not a silver bullet either, because CEOs were too
often tempted to boost short-term value while disregarding long-term
prosperity. Thus, boards instituted restricted stock options, for example,
those that would only vest after five or ten years.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
Nicolai, supra note 31.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
Id.
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At every turn, the assumption was that CEOs were solely “profit
maximizing,” just as the traditional economic rational actor model would
predict; however, a situational analysis would recognize the wider range
of forces that affect CEOs. Of course money matters, but so does
reputation. So does social standing, and so does respect from peers.210
Money is a metric of that performance, but it is not the only metric.
Many of the problems regarding CEO pay stem from this fundamental
blindness. Indeed, increasing equity compensation is positively
correlated with risk of earnings restatements.211 Clearly, the current
system is not working.
Blindness to situation also explains why the nature of corporate
governance reforms often turns out to be illusory. If reform were truly
successful, then one would predict a significant reduction in corporate
malfeasance after SOX. Yet stories of corporate misconduct have
continued unabated. Why?
Again, the answer turns on situational blindness. Commentators on
this subject have tended to view any misconduct as the work of a few
“bad apples.” When we see more misconduct, we assume that there are
simply more bad apples than there were earlier.212 The bigger question is
rarely asked: what situation made this misconduct possible? We miss the
orchard for the apples. When we do so, we forget that “bad apples are
made, not born.”213
Our prescriptions in this paper call for more situational awareness
— to take a look at the orchard. If policymakers and business leaders do
not address the situational causes of misconduct, it is a near guarantee
that there will be more misconduct in the future. It is only by
recognizing that situation matters that we can begin to take control of
that situation and harness it for positive change.
As the WorldCom example shows,214 the market’s situational
pressures can be a tremendous force that drives companies to engage in
210. Cf. Joann S. Lublin, Creative Compensation Tactics Help Forge a Company’s Culture,
Wall St. J. Online, April 17, 2006, http://www.careerjournal.com/salaryhiring/hotissues/20060417lublin.html. The company’s president does not reward his employees with more money, which the
traditional economic model would suggest is all that matters. Instead, he rewards them with an
“experience,” such as being rich for an evening: getting picked up in a limousine, going to an
expensive restaurant, and so on. Id. He believes, rightly, that these experiences are more memorable
than a direct-deposited bonus. Id. The example illustrates yet another way in which people are not
solely “wealth-maximizing.”
211. See supra notes 154-61, 164 and accompanying text.
212. Chen & Hanson, supra note 6, at n.285.
213. Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Op-Ed., Cleaning Up the Corruption in Business
and Politics, BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 2006, at A11.
214. See Belson, supra note 13; supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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conduct that harms customers, employees, and shareholders. While the
market forces companies to “keep up” with their malfeasant competitor,
policy can foster countervailing situational forces. Indeed, if companies
know that a malfeasant competitor will be held to account, then not only
are the incentives to engage in malfeasance lowered, the incentives to
match that competitor’s conduct are also reduced.
One way to accomplish this, in addition to the statutory revisions
we suggest above and the policy prescriptions we list below, is to
incorporate elements of truly independent oversight. Across industries,
countries, and sectors, the lesson is the same: when stakes get large
enough, the likelihood of ethical and legal misconduct increases.215 In
recent years, we have seen this misconduct in the corporate world, in
corrections facilities,216 in sports,217 in religious institutions,218 in
campaign finance,219 and at the United Nations.220 In situations like this,
only real, independent oversight has the possibility of creating the right
incentives; anything less will provide the illusion of reform, and perhaps
even comfort, but it will not change the underlying situation.
To some extent, companies recognize the importance of situational
pressures. For example, as discussed before, the Thompson Memo did
not, by its terms, require companies to waive the attorney-client
privilege or cut off employees’ legal fees.221 However, the pressures on
215. See, e.g., E-mail from Frank A. Nicolai to Scott Harshbarger, Senior Counsel to the Firm,
Proskauer Rose LLP (Jan. 16, 2006, 11:04 EDT) (on file with authors) (noting that “when the stakes
get large enough,” there is a heightened need for vigilance as fraud is more likely to occur).
216. See., e.g., GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CORR. REFORM, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.,
STRENGTHENING PUBLIC SAFETY, INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY, AND INSTITUTING FISCAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION (2004), available at http://www.mass.gov/
Eeops/docs/eops/GovCommission_Corrections_Reform.pdf (Scott Harshbarger, Chairman).
217. See, e.g., Stephen Cannella, Due Process on the Hill, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 11,
2005,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2005/writers/stephen_cannella/03/11/steroids.congress/index.html
(discussing the steroids scandal in Major League Baseball and the failure of league to address the
problem).
218. See, e.g., CatholiCity, Catholic Commentary on the Scandals in the Church,
http://www.catholicity.com/scandals.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2005).
219. See, e.g., Susan Schmidt et al., Investigating Abramoff—Special Report, WASH. POST,
June
22,
2005,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
linkset/2005/06/22/LI2005062200936.html (discussing the Jack Abramoff lobbying scandal).
220. See, e.g., Colum Lynch, Oil-for-Food Panel Rebukes Annan, Cites Corruption, WASH.
POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at A01 (describing corruption at the highest reaches of the UN relating to the
Oil-for-Food program).
221. Cf. Brad D. Brian, Corporate Responsibility: The Lawyer’s Role, 32 LITIG. 1, 62 (Spring
2006) (noting that the waiver provision in the Thompson memo is “stated as a narrow exception”).
We believe that waiver should be treated as a narrow exception and take no issue with the memo
itself; we do, however, believe that some prosecutorial tactics may have crossed the line. See also
United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d. 330, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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them may be so great that the “choice” they face is not a choice in the
usual sense at all; prosecutors’ heavy-handed tactics put companies in a
situation where they have no meaningful option to refuse.222 But the idea
we are discussing and that Hanson has written about is not like an item
in a buffet, to be drawn from when the fancy strikes. Situational forces
affect all of us, regulators and corporations alike, at all times. Just as the
“choice” to waive the privilege may not be truly free, so too do pressures
induce prosecutors to bring marginal cases or transgress ethical
boundaries in their tactics.223 These poor decisions, we believe, are the
result of the overly-antagonistic environment we described earlier.224
Obviously, those who committed crimes — the real bad apples —
should be held to account. But Enron, WorldCom, AIG, and the others
should not become scapegoats, and our policies should recognize a
critical fact: that situation matters.
VII. MOVING FORWARD
So situation matters. How, then, can we — regulators, business
leaders, and citizens — work to change that situation? Here, we propose
a series of remedies that detail the points outlined at the start of this
Article. It is important to remember, however, that this is not a problem
that any one group could (or should) solve by itself; instead, forging a
new, ethical corporate culture requires a concerted effort from several
different groups.
These prescriptions are very specific at some points, but the ideas
motivating the suggestions are applicable in a variety of contexts; the
push toward greater transparency, accountability and ethics is not limited
to any one sector. After Enron and WorldCom, the initial focus was on
large, publicly traded corporations. Today’s new reality has affected
accounting firms, investment banks, and mutual funds. Hedge funds and
222. Cf. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d. at 363.
223. Interestingly, as Chen and Hanson point out, corporate law scholars (and corporations
generally) invest a lot of time and money in promoting the idea that consumers are rational
choosers, not moved by their situation. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 6. Yet in this context,
corporations are arguing precisely that their choices are constrained by situational forces. Indeed,
Judge Kaplan characterized prosecutors’ tactics as a “proverbial gun to the head.” Stein¸ 435 F.
Supp. 2d at 336. Of course, many situations that consumers find themselves in on a regular basis
might involve such situational constraints. One would think, though, that what’s good for the goose
is good for the gander: if consumers are dispositionist choosers, then why can corporations not
simply choose according to their preferences when faced with prosecutors’ requests? Of course, we
do not believe that both corporations and consumers are capable of avoiding situational pressures;
instead, we argue that both of them (and indeed all of us) are situational characters, again
emphasizing the importance of situational forces, in corporate law as generally.
224. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
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private equity firms are likely next in regulators’ sights as the oncenovel investment vehicles become increasingly mainstream;225 SEC
Chairman Cox has pledged that the SEC will not back off of regulating
hedge funds even though its old regulation was struck down.226 In short,
this section outlines the kinds of changes that are needed if we are to
foster a climate of corporate integrity.
A. Business Leaders
First and foremost, business leaders must see this as a window of
opportunity and not a threat. Instead of instinctively opposing any
attempt at regulation, directors and officers should offer their own
suggestions for good governance and stay ahead of the curve. As
described earlier, this will pay off, literally, in the marketplace.227 But it
will also demonstrate that companies are willing to be critical of
themselves and each other, and this will provide regulators with an
incentive to focus only on the low-hanging fruit mentioned earlier.
Indeed, the FSGOs make explicit provisions for “downward departures”
if companies have effective compliance and ethics programs as well as if
they self-report wrongdoing, cooperate with authorities, and accept
responsibility.228 The simplest way for companies to improve their
corporate culture is to adopt best practices from the private, public, and
nonprofit sectors: independent and empowered boards, regular
governance audits, checks and balances, accountability for principals,
and so on.229
This will involve a learning curve as CEOs and boards of directors

225. The “mainstreaming” of hedge funds is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that the largest
hedge fund manager is no longer some exotic boutique but Goldman, Sachs, & Co. See Alistair
Barr, Goldman is Now World’s Largest Hedge Fund Manager, MARKETWATCH, June 21, 2006,
available at http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7BE72DC62B-E5C74C92-91C6-1400725AC835%7D.
226. See Testimony Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds: Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Christopher Cox,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) (indicating that regulation of hedge funds before
the now-struck rule was “inadequate” and now, after the rule’s rejection, “that is once again the
case”). Cox went on to say that the SEC would “promulgate a new antifraud rule under § 206(4) of
the Investment Advisers Act that would have the effect of ‘looking through’ a hedge fund to its
investors” (instead of counting an LLC as one client, the change would count each investor in the
LLC as a client) in order to clarify the fiduciary duties and obligations that the fund has. Id.
227. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
228. See USSG §§ 8C2.5(f) - (g).
229. See, e.g., Pablo Eisenberg, Philanthropy Must Challenge Corporate America, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 18, 2005, available at http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/
aboutus/media/ChroniclePhilanthropy_challenge.html.
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come to acquire the knowledge, skill, and attitude to make ethics an
integral part of corporate culture. Over time the practices in place will be
continually evaluated, modified, and revised.230 At every step of the
way, as they innovate toward this end, business leaders should hold
themselves out as models for others to emulate.
A few years ago, companies laid off employees in a race to the
bottom, trying to match WorldCom’s fictional profits.231 This is the
pitfall of being ethical in a competitive market: the pressures of
competition are so severe that well-meaning companies find themselves
forced to keep pace with the malfeasant competitor or suffer losses.232
Next time, we can make the opposite of the WorldCom story happen: if
the well-intentioned CEO knows that regulators will hold its competitor
accountable, the market incentives are not for the ethical company to
lower its standards, but instead, for the malfeasant company to raise its
standards. This illustrates two points: first, if regulation properly aligns
incentives, market forces can do the rest.233 Second, a strong regulatory
baseline is absolutely essential to turn a “race to the bottom” into a “race
to the top.” Indeed, only such a baseline can provide business leaders
with the protection they need to be ethical in a competitive market.
The most important thing companies can do is to have clear ethical
standards in place that actively foster a culture of compliance with the
letter and spirit of laws. The FSGOs suggest as much and provide a
seven-point plan that, if met, would be sufficient to qualify for a
downward departure at sentencing.234 However, the FSGOs are only one
part of a larger picture. Indeed, if the guidelines were all that were
needed, every organization would be in perfect compliance since they
would always want to protect against more severe sentences. Instead, as
the ACC’s paper indicates, the FSGOs have been taken by many as the
starting point for a needed dialogue between business and government
leaders.235 In the meantime, business leaders must indicate to everyone
in their firms, from the CEO and board to day-to-day managers and
operators, that a transparent, ethical culture and not just mere
compliance with the law is a priority for the company and its long-term
planning.
230. And corporations are best-situated to make these types of modifications, since the
information costs are prohibitively high for the government.
231. See Belson, supra note 13.
232. See generally Chen & Hanson, supra note 6 (describing the influence of situational forces
on corporations).
233. Cf. id.
234. USSG § 8B2.1(b)(1) - (7).
235. See supra note 47.
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The recent scandal at H.P. over “pretexting” illustrates the point
that ethical considerations are important over and above legal
considerations. In investigating boardroom leaks, H.P. resorted to
practices of questionable legality.236 Although “the company’s lawyers
had concluded pretexting was legal, . . . the documents and memos sent
between the lawyers and detectives show that they had not given much
consideration as to whether it was ethical.”237 When two investigators
did raise ethical concerns, they were not taken as seriously as they
should have been.238 This type of mentality is precisely that which we
seek to change when we call for a broad-based shift in corporate culture.
These changes cannot be all talk; after all, Enron had an ethics
manual that was half an inch thick.239 Business leaders must follow up
with concrete steps to show that they are putting their money where their
mouths are. We want “pay for performance” for our public school
teachers, so why not our CEOs? In a relatively recent example, John
Mack, the new CEO of Morgan Stanley, said that he will forego
guaranteed compensation of $25 million and instead receive pay based
on the company’s performance.240 Such a move is a step in the right
direction, and Morgan Stanley should be commended. But it should also
be vocal and emphatic in underscoring its emphasis on accountability
and increase pressure on its competitors to do likewise. Simultaneously,
Morgan Stanley’s board should hold Mack accountable. We have
proposed a legal reform that would strengthen SOX’s clawback
provisions,241 but if the board were serious about pay for performance it
should have written even stronger provisions into Mack’s contract.
Additionally, companies should ensure that boards are truly
engaged and independent. Donn Vickrey, a founder of Camelback
Research, argues that many companies simply state that their directors
are independent without demonstrating how — and worse, without
recognizing glaring conflicts of interest.242 He points to one example
where a health care concern’s founder invested his money through an

236. Darlin, supra note 24.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Harry Hurt III, Drop That Ledger! This is the Compliance Officer, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2005, § 3, at 5.
240. CNNMoney.com,
Morgan
Stanley
CEO
Shuns
Pay
Guarantee,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/07/08/news/fortune500/morganstanley_mack.reut (last visited July 14,
2005). See also Randall Smith, Morgan Stanley’s Mack Gives Up Guarantee Following Pay Furor,
WALL ST. J., July 11, 2005, at C3.
241. See supra Part IVB.
242. Morgenson, supra note 90.
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investment firm, founded by one of the directors that invested in health
care concerns.243 In another case, a person was used to conduct an
outside audit of a company.244 That same auditor was later hired as a
director to chair the audit committee — a position in which he had to
review the adequacy of his own earlier inquiry!245
A common reply from businesses is that independent boards are not
sufficiently knowledgeable about the goings-on of a firm to make
informed decisions.246 However, independence does not mean ignorance;
companies can and should seek out directors who have relevant
business, financial, or legal experience.247 Such directors can be found
without resorting to the conflicts of interest and self-dealing described
earlier. Again, this makes good business sense: Korean firms with
independent directors making up at least half of their board had a 20%
higher share price.248 Shareholders benefit in other ways as well. CEOs
were more likely to get “lucky grants” — those that were most likely the
result of backdating — when the board lacked a majority of independent
directors, and outside directors were more likely to receive “lucky”
grants when there were entrenchment arrangements in place that
protected them from removal.249 The message is clear: independent
directors can add checks and balances without sacrificing expertise, all
while improving the company’s bottom line.
There are, of course, many other steps that can be taken. Companies
should engage independent law firms to conduct regular audits of
governance practices. Boards of directors should aggressively pursue
clawbacks from malfeasant executives, perhaps even more aggressive
than the 150% formula we suggested earlier.250 Lawyers, accountants,
and other professionals should report malfeasance as high up in the
organization as possible — directly to the board if necessary — and be

243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Letter from David Gladstone, Chairman, National Association of Business
Development Companies, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission
(Feb. 11, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/s70304-15.pdf (last visited
Sept. 3, 2005).
247. Cf. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee:
Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE. L.J. 517, 563
(2003) (pointing out “that the selection of one director with financial expertise may offer more
protection against restatements than an audit committee comprised of only [non-expert] independent
directors”).
248. See supra note 192.
249. See Bebchuk, Inside Jobs, supra note 162.
250. See supra Section IVB.
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permitted to make confidential, anonymous reports to the government if
there are no satisfactory responses.251
B. Regulators
For their part, regulators must ensure that prosecution and
enforcement do not become ends in themselves. Particularly in the
marketplace, laws must be enforced to foster competition and efficiency,
not just for the sake of prosecuting. In this spirit, regulators should offer
an “amnesty” period to companies that disclose knowledge of
malfeasance within a reasonable amount of time, allowing companies
enough time to investigate and address shortcomings.252 In exchange for
implementation of good faith measures to remedy these shortcomings,
the SEC, Attorneys-General, and other regulators should agree not to
prosecute these companies. To the extent possible, they should enter into
limited-waiver and confidentiality agreements to ensure that privileged
material disclosed to the government will not be available to private
plaintiffs. When private litigation commences, the regulators should
assert their own privilege over the corporate documents; in anticipation
of private litigation, regulators should contract with the corporation to
affirm that they will vigorously assert the privilege. Even if the firms
subjected themselves to stock losses and potential lawsuits from private
citizens upon disclosing, the costs would not be nearly as high as if they
allowed problems to fester and explode at some point in the future. Even
if the “market costs” (loss of shareholder value and lawsuits) were
exactly the same, the company would still be better off without the threat
of government prosecution and multi-million (or billion) dollar
settlements because “[t]oday, more than ever, securities class action
cases are more expensive to resolve and take longer to close.”253
Regulators must capitalize on this cooperation by being flexible
251. See supra Section IVC. Regulators could receive this information in anonymous or
aggregate form. The evidence, if any, of wrongdoing could be inadmissible in court, thus ensuring
that, for practical purposes, the information is treated as confidential. Attorney disclosure in this
context should not be held to be a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, an issue that can be
clarified through judicial determination or proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502. In any event,
even setting this aside, from a purely public relations perspective, there is no rationale for not
disclosing to the highest level possible.
252. Cf. Thompson Memo, supra note 59, at § VI B (discussing amnesty in antitrust cases).
The Thompson Memo also describes the mitigating effect of a corporation’s “timely and voluntary
disclosure of wrongdoing” in determining whether to bring charges against a corporation. Id.
253. Carol A.N. Zacharias, Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation and Directors and
Officers Liability Insurance, 20 JOHN LINER REV. 1, 14 (Summer 2006), available at
http://www.ace-ina.com/docs/JLR_Summer_2006.pdf.
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when the need arises. One of the frequently heard criticisms of SOX is
that it imposes undue costs on small and mid-sized firms.254 The same
compliance program that works for a Fortune 500 company would be illfitting for a small-cap firm that cannot afford to spend two or three
percent of revenues on compliance. Thus, regulators should allow
different-sized firms in different industries to determine on their own
means to achieve the policy goals behind SOX, FSGO, or any other
regulatory scheme. We have outlined one way that this could happen: by
reforming Section 404 requirements for non-accelerated filers.255 This is,
however, just one example of the type of flexibility that might be
appropriate.
The SEC recently released suggested policy modifications for small
companies, certain foreign investors, and newly public companies.256
The Commission proposes extending the date by which non-accelerated
filers must start providing a report by management assessing the
effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial reporting;
the compliance date would be extended by about 6 months.257 The SEC
also proposed extending the date by which non-accelerated filers must
begin to comply with the Section 404(b) requirement to provide an
auditor’s attestation report on internal control over financial reporting in
their annual reports to fiscal years ending after December, 2008.258
Finally, the SEC relaxed Section 404 requirements for small
companies.259 This example shows that the SEC is, at a minimum,
willing to accommodate some of the issues smaller companies face.
The ACC’s letter describes another possibility of regulatory
flexibility. Recall that the FSGOs require companies to report evidence
of wrongdoing to the government within a reasonable time.260 The ACC
instead recommends that the company either report such wrongdoing or
develop and implement modifications to the company’s practices to
remedy the situation.261 We pointed out earlier that this might provide an
incentive to cover up fraud, since the company would know that it could
“get away” with not publicizing its wrongdoing. Thus, we prefer a
254. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
255. See supra Section IVA.
256. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Offers Further Relief
from Section 404 Compliance for Smaller Public Companies and Many Foreign Private Issuers
(Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-136.htm.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
260. USSG § 8C2.5(f)(2).
261. ACC Letter, supra note 52, at 12.
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middle ground between the existing FSGO provision and the ACC
recommendation. Companies should have to abide by the FSGO
provision or report actual wrongdoing, not merely evidence of
wrongdoing, within one year and make progress toward implementing
new policies and procedures. This would give companies time to address
the situation on their own, while mitigating the incentive to orchestrate a
cover-up. Within parameters, companies should determine how best to
implement the policy behind legislative and regulatory schemes, and
regulators should be receptive to this.
Another good example is still in progress as of this writing. A
recent SEC rule requires companies to count stock options as an expense
on their ledgers.262 We believe that this was the right decision, since
options were liberally granted through the 1990s since companies did
not have to consider these an expense. The new rule requires share-based
compensation to be recognized as an expense based on fair value as of
the grant date.263 However, this raises a follow-up question: what is an
appropriate measure of “fair value”? We support the SEC’s attempt to
“encourage[] . . . robust efforts in the private sector to design market
instruments that have the potential to accurately measure the cost of
employee stock option grants to the issuer.”264
In response to the rule, a variety of private sector actors offered
means to value stock options. Cisco Systems, for example, offered a plan
under which companies could sell similar securities to institutional
investors to value their employees’ options.265 Although the SEC
rejected this particular plan, it kept open the possibility of other marketbased approaches and resisted using a “model-based” approach to value
options.266 This provides yet another example of how a collaborative
approach to addressing a problem is far more productive than a
unilateral approach. Moreover, it shows how corporations can and
should work within a regulatory baseline to find the best solutions.
Corporations are market actors and market actors respond to market
262. See FIN. ACCOUNTING SERIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123, app. 240
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., revised 2004).
263. Id. at ii (Summary).
264. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of Chairman Cox Regarding Use of
Market Instruments in Valuing Employee Stock Options, SEC Release 2005-129 (Sept. 9, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-129.htm [hereinafter Cox Statement]; See FASB
and SEC Guidance on Applying Statement 123R, DEFINING ISSUES (KPMG LLP, New York, N.Y.),
Sept. 2005, available at http://www.us.kpmg.com/services/content.asp?l1id=30&l2id=730&cid=
1137#92.
265. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, U.S. Rejects Cisco Plan on Options, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2005,
at C1.
266. Cox Statement, supra note 264.
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incentives.267 If regulators set out the proper incentives — amnesty, tax
credits, and credible threats of prosecution for those who do violate the
law — firms will figure out on their own the best way to achieve those
incentives, as the FSGO and stock option examples indicate. We need
strong regulation and effective laws on the books; in several respects, we
have argued that SOX does not go far enough. We also believe that
corporate crime must be prosecuted aggressively and that fines and
penalties should be imposed to the fullest extent necessary. At the end of
the day, we only believe that these are means to an end. Under the
current regime, a combative atmosphere pervades business-government
relations, so that the only incentives are for each side to vilify the other.
Instead, laws and regulations should provide a framework within which
market actors determine the most efficient way to build value and foster
an ethical corporate environment.
C. Citizens and Shareholders
If there is one thing that firms understand, it is economics; firms
supply what is in demand. If investors (institutional and retail) continue
to press for an ethical corporate culture, and if regulators establish a
strong baseline, firms will provide one. But investors must be willing to
put their money where their mouths are. It’s easy to push for “good
governance” when markets are doing poorly; poorly-governed firms, in
the long run, cost investors money. But what about when stocks are
rising? After all, institutional investors were not clamoring for more
transparency and openness during the “Roaring ‘90s.” Blaming “poor
governance” (indeed, blaming anything) is easy when times are tough;
investors who truly value integrity will hold companies to account even
when times are good.
The study cited earlier indicated that governance is not already
reflected in stock prices.268 But if investors internalize ethical
governance into their decision-making — as, for example, the Yahoo!
Finance profiles indicate — then, over time, we would expect
governance to be reflected in stock price.269 This should give investors
an incentive to call for good governance when times are good: if high
stock prices already reflect governance, then preserving or improving
those practices becomes more critical to preserving shareholder value; if
already-high stock prices do not reflect governance (as the study cited
267. See generally Chen & Hanson, supra note 6.
268. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
269. See Yahoo! Finance supra note 45.
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earlier demonstrates), then improving governance practices will enhance
shareholder value even more. Of course, as the GMI story indicates, if
governance is poor, then improving practices might stave off financial
losses or even bankruptcy.270
But an ethical corporate culture has to do with more than
shareholder value. In a related context, we wrote that “[a]n ethical
dilemma is not deciding whether to break the law. An ethical dilemma
arises when principles collide within the bounds of the law.”271
Similarly, an ethical dilemma for investors is not whether to lose money
by investing in a poorly-governed company. An ethical dilemma arises
when principles — shareholder value and governance — collide in the
context of a well-performing company.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the broadest sense, an ethical corporate culture is built on the
same foundations as our democracy: checks and balances, openness, and
transparency. It is based on good business judgment and profitability; it
depends on free markets and competition. It is also built on
professionalism, with lawyers, accountants and investment managers
giving objective, expert advice, not swayed to the greatest extent
possible by personal biases. Indeed, much of the breakdown over the
past few years has involved a dereliction of duty on the part of those
who were supposed to be exercising independent judgment in the
corporate world. Among other things, we are asking for those
professionals to play their roles, and in so doing, to protect the business
leaders who are their clients.272
In a sense, our policy prescription is simple: regulators must align
incentives to foster ethical conduct and to make it clearer when
companies shirk this duty. Ever since Sarbanes-Oxley was passed, there
have been those in the business community who have said that the
regulatory response to corporate misconduct went too far and that
markets should be allowed to work. Yet we have seen that markets, left
to their own devices, create in some cases precisely the wrong
incentives: options backdating, “pretexting” at HP, accounting
misconduct, and more. Regulation allows the bad actors to be
270. See supra note 186.
271. Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 24, at 47.
272. When this judgment gets compromised, and there is no true independence between the
professional and his client, the outsider and the insider are one and the same, thus violating the
cardinal rule, that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at
79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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sanctioned, but more than that, it helps turn around a race to the bottom.
Over the past few years, institutions from the Catholic Church273 to
Major League Baseball274 have been the subject of scandal and
controversy. The recent corporate scandals are just the most recent of the
governance crises that have gripped American leadership in many other
ways, and surely there will always be a few bad apples in every barrel.
Over the past several years, however, we have seen a systemic failure of
ethical conduct in American firms. If the leaders of corporate America
can rise to the challenge — can overcome this governance crisis, grow,
and lead as a result — they may be the first to turn a failure of leadership
into a success that benefits us all.

273. See CatholiCity, supra note 218.
274. See Cannella, supra note 217. One sentence in the article is particularly apropos as an
analogy: “The point of hearings like this is to generate publicity and force the people they’re
questioning to police themselves.” Id.
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